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INTRODUCTION 
This Article engages with Ronald Dworkin’s final book, Religion Without 
God,1 approaching this elegant, even elegiac work from several angles. First, in 
Part I, I compare the argumentative strategy of Religion Without God with that 
 
* Professor of Law and Paul M. Siskind Research Scholar, Boston University School of 
Law. I presented a draft of this Article at the Conferencia Internacional, Ronald M. 
Dworkin, UNAM, Mexico City, February 13–14, 2014. I am grateful to Imer B. Flores, 
organizer of that event, and to Itzel Mayans for her incisive commentary. Thanks also to Jim 
Fleming for constructive editorial and substantive comments, and to M. Christian Green for 
raising many insightful questions, some of which I must save for future exploration. Thanks 
as always to Stefanie Weigmann, Assistant Director for Research, Faculty Assistance, and 
Technology, Pappas Law Library, for valuable research assistance. 
1 RONALD DWORKIN, RELIGION WITHOUT GOD (2013). 
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of Dworkin’s prior books, Life’s Dominion2 and Is Democracy Possible Here?3 
In these books, he tackles a polarizing issue where parties are at “war” and 
proposes that, by dispelling “intellectual confusion”4 and offering a fresh 
understanding of what is really at issue, they may be able to have a ceasefire 
or, at least, a substantial reduction of hostility and conflict. So, too, in Religion 
Without God, Dworkin takes on the seemingly “wholly unbridgeable gap”5 
between “believers and nonbelievers” in “the new religious wars” in politics.6 
He argues that “[i]f we can separate God from religion,” this new 
understanding of “what the religious point of view really is” has the potential 
to “shrink both the size and importance of the wars,” so that they would no 
longer be “culture wars,” or to “lower, at least, the temperature of these 
battles.”7 Further, by framing religious freedom around protecting a “general 
right to ethical independence” rather than a “troublesome special right” for 
theistic religious people, Dworkin’s argument calls for a “radical 
reinterpretation of all the constitutions, [human rights] conventions, and human 
rights covenants.”8 In all three works, the new understanding Dworkin urges 
rests on principles about dignity, responsibility, and the intrinsic value of 
human life, with implications for limitations upon governmental authority. 
In Part II, I hone in on how Dworkin’s project in Religion Without God of 
offering an account of religion that reveals underlying convictions that unite 
theists and “religious atheists”9 incorporates characteristic features of 
Dworkin’s philosophy of ethical liberalism, articulated fully in his majestic 
Justice for Hedgehogs.10 Ethical liberalism, which dates back at least to 
Dworkin’s Foundations of Liberal Equality, appeals to convictions about 
dignity, responsibility, the challenge of living life well, the objectivity of 
values, and life’s intrinsic value.11 Another characteristic feature is the turn to 
the aesthetic – to artistic creation – to articulate the idea of living life well and 
 
2 RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE’S DOMINION: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT ABORTION, EUTHANASIA, 
AND INDIVIDUAL FREEDOM (1993). 
3 RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL 
DEBATE 1-2 (2006). 
4 DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 4, 10-11. 
5 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 147. 
6 Id. at 137 (“The new religious wars are now really culture wars.” Id. at 9-10.). 
7 Id. at 9. 
8 Id. at 133. 
9 Id. at 12 (introducing the phrase “religious atheism” to capture “shared territory” 
between theists and atheists, id. at 5). 
10 RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS 13-14 (2011) (arguing for the sovereign 
ethical responsibility to make something of value of our lives by analogy to artistic creation, 
and arguing further that “we must treat the making of our lives as a challenge, one we can 
perform well or badly”). 
11 See Ronald Dworkin, Foundations of Liberal Equality, Lecture at The Tanner Lectures 
on Human Values (May 5 & 10, 1988), in 11 THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1 
(Grethe B. Peterson ed., 1990). 
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making a success of one’s life.12 So, too, Religion Without God reveals 
Dworkin’s continued fascination with the scientific learning of the day, tracing 
out themes of beauty, inevitability, objectivity of value (once again), and 
integrity.13 
In Part III, I ask how persuasive Dworkin is as a theologian or philosopher 
of religion. Specifically, is his new account of religion and religious freedom, 
as he hopes and prays,14 likely to “shrink both the size and the importance of” 
the fierce “culture wars” in the United States between believers and 
nonbelievers – theists and atheists – by showing these groups that they “share a 
fundamental religious impulse”?15 Will the new constitutional frame he offers 
– ethical independence rather than a special right for theists – help to reduce 
conflicts over religious liberty? In short: Is what constitutional law scholar 
Laurence Tribe recently referred to as Dworkin’s “sunny assumption that 
reason would dissolve the deepest differences underlying our legal and 
especially our constitutional outlooks” warranted?16 
I consider several lines of criticism that “believers” might direct at both 
components of Dworkin’s project: his identification of the “religious attitude” 
that can exist apart from a belief in a “personal god” and his “radical 
reinterpretation” of religious freedom for purposes of constitutional 
jurisprudence.17 I use as one foil the account of religion and religious freedom 
developed in Robert P. George’s recent book of essays, Conscience and Its 
Enemies: Confronting the Dogmas of Liberal Secularism.18 Is Dworkin, as 
some critics assert, making religion safe for liberals and liberalism19 in a way 
that denudes or marginalizes it?20 The current controversy over the definition 
 
12 See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 157-58 (arguing for the applicability to any life of the 
Romantic poets’ idea that we should try to “make our lives into works of art”). 
13 Id. at 45-104. Nearly three decades ago, in Law’s Empire, Dworkin analogized to 
astronomy, explaining that “[a]stronomers postulated Neptune before they discovered it,” 
and arguing that “[i]ntegrity is our Neptune.” RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 183 (1986). 
14 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 146-47. 
15 Id. at 9, 146. 
16 Laurence H. Tribe, In Memoriam: Ronald Dworkin, 127 HARV. L. REV. 507, 510 
(2013). 
17 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 9, 33, 133. 
18 ROBERT P. GEORGE, CONSCIENCE AND ITS ENEMIES: CONFRONTING THE DOGMAS OF 
LIBERAL SECULARISM (2013). 
19 See, e.g., Stanley Fish, Deeper than God: Ronald Dworkin’s Religious Atheism, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 23, 2013), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/09/23/deeper-than-god-
ronald-dworkins-religious-atheism, archived at http://perma.cc/MMJ9-H9FS (arguing that 
Dworkin’s book is “speaking . . . to liberals” and is consonant with liberalism’s reducing 
religion to a form that is “perfectly acceptable to liberalism because it is liberalism”). 
20 See, e.g., Mark Movsesian, Religion Without God, FIRST THINGS, http://www.first 
things.com/blogs/firstthoughts/2013/10/religion-without-god (last visited Mar. 24, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/7TFL-HKZA (relating Dworkin’s argument against the special 
status of religion to the left’s efforts to “continue to marginalize traditional religion”). For 
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of marriage is a particularly significant test case for Dworkin’s proposed 
recasting of religious freedom as ethical independence, and here, too, George 
provides a useful counter approach. I ask how Dworkin’s framework would 
address claims brought by believers and religious institutions that these 
developments in civil law (1) reflect an erroneous understanding of the truth of 
marriage, and (2) deeply threaten religious freedom by establishing a new 
governmental orthodoxy hostile to traditional religious belief. 
I. “ONCE MORE UNTO THE BREACH, DEAR FRIENDS”21: DWORKIN TACKLES 
ANOTHER CULTURE WAR 
In this Section, I briefly explicate Dworkin’s argument in Religion Without 
God about the religious attitude, pointing out how it takes further certain ideas 
articulated in Justice for Hedgehogs. I then point out similarities between 
Religion Without God and prior works by Dworkin offering an intervention 
into a polarizing issue where parties are, as it were, at war, namely, Life’s 
Dominion and Is Democracy Possible Here? In each instance, Dworkin takes 
on a seemingly “unbridgeable” divide and reveals that a clearer understanding 
of what is at stake offers a way out.22 Not only is the method similar in each 
instance, but so too is the substantive content of the principles around which 
reconciliation is possible. Thus, the “religious attitude” that, Religion Without 
God contends, unites rather than divides believers and nonbelievers resonates 
with key principles identified in these two earlier works and carried further in 
Justice for Hedgehogs, as I discuss in Part II. 
A. Religion Without God: Identifying the Shared Religious Impulse 
In Religion Without God, Dworkin expresses a “a hope; indeed, . . . a 
prayer,” that if people come to understand that they “share a fundamental 
religious impulse that has manifested itself in various convictions and 
emotions,” theists and atheists “may come to accept that what they now take to 
be a wholly unbridgeable gap is only an esoteric kind of scientific 
disagreement with no moral or political implications.”23 For “the new religious 
wars,” he contends, “are now really culture wars . . . not just about scientific 
history” – for example, intelligent design versus evolution – “but more 
fundamentally about the meaning of human life and what living well means.”24 
That religious impulse, Dworkin argues, historically has included two distinct 
kinds of convictions: “[A] belief in an intelligent supernatural force – a god – 
 
additional criticisms along these lines, see infra Part III. 
21 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HENRY V act 3, sc. 1. Apologies to Dworkin and to 
Shakespeare for the questionable aptness of this line. I had King Henry V’s rousing speech 
on my mind after recently watching a stunning new version of Henry V in the Hollow 
Crown series. The Hollow Crown: Henry V (BBC Two television broadcast Dec. 29, 2012). 
22 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 147. 
23 Id. at 146-47. 
24 Id. at 9. 
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and a set of profound ethical and moral convictions.”25 Dworkin speaks of 
these, respectively, as the “science” part of religion and the “value” part; he 
argues that, even though historically they have traveled together, they are 
“conceptually independent” of one another.26 Thus, an atheist can have 
“religion without god” if he or she has a religious attitude toward the world. In 
Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin similarly refers to dividing religion into two 
parts: the “cosmological” (that is, “How did the world and its parts, including 
life and human life, come to exist?”), and the “evaluative” (that is, questions 
about right and wrong, such as “What must I do with my life?” and “How must 
I treat other people?”).27 
In a sense, this religious attitude – with its two-pronged focus on science 
and value – carries forward the project expressed in the final pages of Justice 
for Hedgehogs, where Dworkin calls for a “postcolonial conception of truth,” 
insisting that evaluative judgments about truth and what makes life go well 
need not hinge on physics.28 There, Dworkin decries how modern philosophers 
have “inflated the methods of physics into a totalitarian metaphysics,” raising 
concerns about how to “test” judgments about value.29 Dworkin, however, 
counters that a postcolonial conception would affirm “the profound 
independence of morality, ethics, and other forms of value”; rather than 
seeking to “certify” the truth of our value judgments through scientific or 
metaphysical discoveries, we instead “must make a case, not supply evidence, 
for our convictions.”30 
In Religion Without God, Dworkin’s postcolonial conception of truth 
affirms the independence of the “science” and “value” parts of religion, but 
links them in a certain “religious” orientation toward the world. The religious 
attitude, he argues, “accepts the full, independent reality of value” and “the 
objective truth of two central judgments about value.”31 The first judgment 
“holds that human life has objective meaning or importance,” so that “[e]ach 
person has an innate and inescapable responsibility to try to make his life a 
successful one.”32 Dworkin elaborates: “[T]hat means living well, accepting 
ethical responsibilities to oneself as well as moral responsibilities to others, not 
just if we happen to think this important but because it is in itself important 
whether we think so or not.”33 The second judgment “holds that what we call 
‘nature’—the universe as a whole and in all its parts—is not just a matter of 
 
25 Id. at 146. 
26 Id. at 24-25. 
27 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 340-41. 
28 Id. at 418 (“Ethics and morality are independent of physics and its partners.”). 
29 Id. at 417. 
30 Id. at 418. 
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fact but is itself sublime: something of intrinsic value and wonder.”34 
“Together these two . . . value judgments,” Dworkin argues, are 
“comprehensive” and “declare inherent value in both dimensions of human 
life: biological and biographical.”35 
I focus more on Dworkin’s arguments about “the value part” of religion than 
“the science part,” since the former are more pertinent to his argument for 
reconceiving religious freedom. The “value part” of conventional theistic 
religions, such as Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, Dworkin contends, “offers 
a variety of convictions about how people should live and what they should 
value.”36 Some of those convictions, what he calls “godly commitments,” are 
“parasitic” on a belief about a personal god and “declare duties of worship, 
prayer, and obedience to the god the religion endorses.”37 (I return to potential 
problems with Dworkin’s inclusion of “obedience” in this “godly” part later in 
this Article.) Other “religious values,” Dworkin continues, are not “parasitic” 
in this way and so are “independent” of that “assumption of a god.”38 Indeed, 
he contends, the two “paradigm religious values” he identifies “are in that way 
independent,” and can unite believers and religious atheists even though the 
latter “do not believe in a god and so reject the science of conventional 
religions and the godly commitments, like a duty of ritual worship.”39 For 
religious atheists “accept that it matters objectively how a human life goes and 
that everyone has an innate, inalienable ethical responsibility to try to live as 
well as possible in his circumstances.”40 And, turning to the second “paradigm 
value,” religious atheists “accept that nature is not just a matter of particulars 
thrown together in a very long history but something of intrinsic wonder and 
beauty.”41 
 
34 Id. In his review, Moshe Halbertal observes that Dworkin’s rejection of naturalism, 
evident both in his insistence on the objective foundation for our values and his argument 
that “the universe is genuinely enchanted,” runs “against much of contemporary dogma.” 
Moshe Halbertal, Can You Have Religion Without God? Ronald Dworkin and a Religious 
Worldview for Secularists, NEW REPUBLIC (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.newrepublic.com/ 
article/114898/ronald-dworkins-religion-without-god-reviewed-religios-worldview, 
archived at http://perma.cc/PM4A-8A7J. For a critique that Dworkin’s account of 
naturalism rests on stereotyped views of naturalists, see Charles Murn, Book Review: 
Religion Without God, HUMANIST (Dec. 20, 2013), http://thehumanist.org/january-february-
2014/religion-without-god, archived at http://perma.cc/VK6R-2G7U. 
35 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 11. 
36 Id. at 23. 




41 Id. In Part III, I consider whether this account of religion is likely to be persuasive to 
conservative religious theorists and what potential it holds for ongoing controversies about 
religious liberty and the place of religion in public life. 
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B. Life’s Dominion: Shared Intuitions About the Sanctity of Life 
Dworkin’s intervention into the “culture wars” over religion has parallels 
with his earlier interventions into forms of “religious” or “culture” war over 
abortion. In Life’s Dominion, Dworkin argued that the contemporary battle 
over abortion rights is “America’s new version of the terrible seventeenth-
century European civil wars of religion.”42 He also argued that one reason the 
battle over religion has seemed “fiercer and more violent in America than 
anywhere else” is because of “the peculiar paradox of America’s ambivalence 
toward religion”: formal separation, under the U.S. Constitution, of church and 
state, but a populace that is “among the most religious of modern Western 
countries,” and that includes fundamentalist groups among “the most powerful 
religious groups.”43 He submitted that “the character of the abortion argument 
is wrong.”44 Dworkin argued that “the standard view of the character of the 
abortion argument” framed it around the “polarizing question” of whether a 
fetus is “a helpless unborn child with rights and interests of its own from the 
moment of conception,” such that “permitting abortion is permitting murder.”45 
Analogizing to slavery, apartheid, and rape, Dworkin argued that “[s]elf-
respecting people” who answered that question differently could hardly be 
expected to “compromise.”46 Dworkin submitted that this conventional and 
polarizing framing reflected “widespread intellectual confusion” that “we can 
identify and dispel,” allowing a “responsible legal settlement of the 
controversy” that everyone “can accept with full self-respect.”47 
That settlement would rest on a new understanding: that people share certain 
intuitions about the sanctity of life – that life is sacred and has intrinsic value, 
and that it is important that a life, once begun, go well rather than be wasted. 
What divides them, then, is “how best to respect a fundamental idea we almost 
all share in some form: that individual human life is sacred.”48 Dworkin 
appealed to nature and to art to explain these intuitions, a characteristic feature 
of his work.49 He clarified that his argument accepted the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s decision that a fetus is not a constitutional person “with rights and 
interests of its own,” and instead framed the issue in terms of what 
governmental regulation is permissible to express respect for “the sanctity of 
human life.”50 
 
42 DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 4. 
43 Id. at 6. 
44 Id. at 10-11. 
45 Id. at 9. 
46 Id. at 10. 
47 Id. at 10-11. 
48 Id. at 13. 
49 Id. at 71-81 (illustrating the idea of the sacred by referring to attitudes about works of 
art and about protecting endangered species). 
50 Id. at 161. 
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Dworkin translated his philosophical argument into an account of 
constitutionally permissible – and impermissible – governmental regulation.51 
As I address elsewhere (individually and with James Fleming), Dworkin 
distinguishes between government insisting upon (that is, coercing) conformity 
and encouraging responsibility: government may not compel a woman’s 
abortion decision to further its view about sanctity, but it may regulate in ways 
that encourage her to “treat the question of abortion seriously,” because it is a 
decision implicating the intrinsic value of the sanctity of life.52 Dworkin also 
showed how his distinction between the governmental goals of conformity and 
responsibility mapped well onto the joint opinion’s analysis in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey.53 That argument is not my 
focus here; instead, what is striking in light of Religion Without God is 
Dworkin’s argument in Life’s Dominion that, among the “textual homes” for 
the right of procreative autonomy is the First Amendment, because “the First 
Amendment forbids states to force people to conform to an official view about 
what the sanctity of human life requires.”54 The gist of his argument is: “If 
people’s convictions about what the inherent value of human life requires are 
religious convictions, a government’s demand for conformity would be 
imposing a collective religion,” and would violate both the Free Exercise and 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment.55 Dworkin argues that the free 
exercise of religion should include a broad understanding of what “religious” 
 
51 Id. at 160-68 (discussing the constitutional bases for the right to procreative autonomy 
and limits on government regulation). 
52 I evaluate Dworkin’s analysis in several works. See, e.g., JAMES E. FLEMING & LINDA 
C. MCCLAIN, ORDERED LIBERTY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND VIRTUES 50-80 (2013) 
(contrasting Dworkin’s approach with Mary Ann Glendon’s to suggest a distinction between 
responsibility as autonomy and responsibility as accountability); LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE 
PLACE OF FAMILIES: FOSTERING CAPACITY, EQUALITY, AND RESPONSIBILITY 228 (2006) 
(discussing Dworkin’s distinction between conformity and responsibility favorably and 
agreeing that government, “consistent with respect for constitutional liberty, may encourage 
the goal of ‘responsibility’ in the sense of reflective decision making”); Linda C. McClain, 
Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives: Beyond “Empty” 
Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 OHIO STATE L.J. 19, 91-100 (1998) (supporting 
Dworkin’s distinction between conformity and responsibility, but raising questions about 
governmental persuasion in the context of women’s abortion decisions). 
53 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (“What is at stake is the 
woman’s right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in 
doing so,” id. at 877, and as such, “states are free to enact laws to provide a reasonable 
framework for a woman to make a decision that has such profound and lasting meaning,” id. 
at 916); DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 152-53 (quoting the Casey joint opinion as articulating 
the state’s “legitimate interest in encouraging responsibility”). Dworkin was critical of the 
Casey joint opinion’s conclusion that the Pennsylvania statute did not constitute an undue 
burden. Id. at 173. 
54 DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 160-61. 
55 Id. at 162. 
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belief is.56 He reiterates these arguments – sometimes incorporating them by 
reference – in Religion Without God.57 
In Life’s Dominion, Dworkin points to Supreme Court precedents upholding 
conscientious objection to war as religious, even in the absence of a belief in a 
personal god.58 He makes a point to which he returns in Religion Without God: 
“Once the idea of religion is separated from the idea of a god, however, courts 
that accept the constraints of integrity face great difficulty in distinguishing 
between religious and other kinds of conviction.”59 Dworkin argues that one 
limiting principle is content. For example, Dworkin states: “a belief in the 
objective and intrinsic importance of human life has a distinctly religious 
content.”60 I quote in full his emphasis in Life’s Dominion that religious belief 
or conviction need not presuppose a god: 
Convictions that endorse the objective importance of human life speak to 
the same issues – about the place of an individual human life in an 
impersonal and infinite universe – as orthodox religious beliefs do for 
those who hold them. 
. . . . 
I can think of no plausible account of the content that a belief must have 
in order to be deemed religious that would rule out convictions about why 
and how human life has intrinsic objective importance, except the 
abandoned notion that religious belief must presuppose a god. It is, of 
course, essential that any test of religious content distinguish between 
religious beliefs on the one hand and nonreligious political or moral 
convictions on the other. But we have already seen how the belief in life’s 
intrinsic objective importance (and other beliefs that interpret and follow 
directly from that belief) differs from opinions about political fairness or 
the just distribution of economic or other resources.61 
Dworkin then explains that “the popular sense that the abortion issue is 
fundamentally a religious one” is “at bottom sound,” although “for reasons 
somewhat more complex than is often supposed.”62 Namely: 
They rest on a natural – indeed, irresistible – understanding of the First 
Amendment: that a state has no business prescribing what people should 
think about the ultimate point and value of human life, about why human 
 
56 Id. at 165. 
57 See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 106-07, 120-24, 144-45 (questioning what constitutes a 
religion and ultimately concluding that religious freedom should be considered part of 
ethical and moral independence). 
58 DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 162 (discussing United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 
(1965)). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 163. 
61 Id. at 163-64. 
62 Id. at 164. 
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life has intrinsic importance, and about how that value is respected or 
dishonored in different circumstances.63 
This does not mean “every woman who decides to have an abortion broods 
first about why and how human life is sacred,” but she may still “act out of 
convictions that . . . presuppose views about that essentially religious issue.” 
Hence, “a government that makes abortion a crime denies the free exercise of 
religion as much to such women as to women who do self-consciously draw 
their views about abortion from religious faith.”64 
Dworkin concludes that “the right to procreative autonomy, from which a 
right of choice about abortion flows, is well grounded in the First 
Amendment,” as well as in “the best interpretation of constitutional liberty and 
equality.”65 Dworkin also grounds the right to procreative autonomy in 
“Western political culture more generally,” namely, in its “belief in individual 
human dignity: that people have the moral right – and the moral responsibility 
– to confront the most fundamental questions about the meaning and value of 
their own lives for themselves, answering to their own consciences and 
convictions.”66 Moreover, in a characteristic move, Dworkin argues that 
precisely because of our commitment to dignity, while we may and should care 
deeply about other people respecting “the intrinsic value of human life,” 
because their decisions shape the moral environment, we “must insist on 
religious tolerance in this area.”67 Dworkin reiterates the essentially religious 
nature of the issue, enlisting some of the core tenets of his account of ethical 
liberalism: 
Tolerance is a cost we must pay for our adventure in liberty. We are 
committed, by our love of liberty and dignity, to live in communities in 
which no group is thought clever or spiritual or numerous enough to 
decide essentially religious matters for everyone else. If we have genuine 
concern for the lives others lead, we will also accept that no life is a good 
one lived against the grain of conviction, that it does not help someone 
else’s life but spoils it to force values upon him he cannot accept but can 
only bow before out of fear or prudence.68 
In Religion Without God, Dworkin returns to his argument for a First 
Amendment grounding for the right to procreative autonomy.69 
Acknowledging the problems with a concept of religion limited to theism, he 
 
63 Id. at 164-65. 
64 Id. at 165. Dworkin continues that, even if a woman acts “for some other reason that 
cannot be traced to even submerged views about the sanctity of life,” her decision is still 
protected by the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution. Id. 
65 Id. at 166. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 167. 
68 Id. at 167-68. 
69 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 107. 
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contends that “[i]f . . . freedom of religion is not restricted to opinions about a 
god, but embraces all deep convictions about the purpose and responsibilities 
of life, then it might be thought an open question whether the right to abortion 
is a religious issue.”70 Certainly, “much of the opposition to abortion assumes 
that a god has forbidden that act”; but “not all opposition is based on theism, 
and few women who want an abortion believe that a god has ordered them to 
abort.”71 This idea of being “ordered” to abort is an odd way to put the matter; 
many analyses of women’s abortion decisions indicate that a woman’s 
religious convictions play a role in her decision making to continue or 
terminate a pregnancy.72 Moreover, different religious denominations vary in 
their ethical teachings about whether and when abortion is morally 
permissible; even within denominations opposing abortion rights, some 
dissenting voices argue for protecting “a woman’s moral and legal right to 
follow her conscience in matters of sexuality and reproductive health.”73 In 
other words, a subtler framing of Dworkin’s argument could draw on a 
spectrum of conscientious religious views to suggest the “essentially religious” 
nature of the issue for many people. 
In any case, Dworkin revisits the abortion issue in Religion Without God to 
contend that moving away from a special right to religious freedom to a more 
general right to ethical independence could help to make progress on “the new 
religious wars” in American politics, in which “sexual and reproductive 
morality” – including the right to abortion – is “undoubtedly the most divisive 
issue of all.”74 He observes that when the Supreme Court decided “a state lacks 
power to criminalize . . . early abortions,” the Court “had no choice” but to 
“locate[]” its opinion doctrinally in “the equal protection and due process 
clauses” rather than the “First Amendment guarantees of religious freedom” 
because, while “[o]pponents of . . . abortion very often cite a god’s will as 




72 See, e.g., Brief of the Institute for Reproductive Health Access et al. as Amici Curiae 
in Support of Respondents at 29, Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007) (Nos. 15-1382 & 
05-380), 2006 WL 2736633 (“[T]hese women rely upon intimate moral, religious, and 
personal values to make the right decision for themselves and their families.”). 
73 About Us, CATHOLICS FOR CHOICE, http://www.catholicsforchoice.org/about (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/E5ER-5LU6. For a classic argument for 
a right to choose made from within a religious tradition, see BEVERLY WILDUNG HARRISON, 
OUR RIGHT TO CHOOSE: TOWARD A NEW ETHIC OF ABORTION 117-53, 187-230 (1983). 
74 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 137, 144. Dworkin also revisits this issue in Justice for 
Hedgehogs, asking what “fresh light” his argument about dignity could shed on the issue. 
DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 376. He first argues that “now, dignity provides the only 
available justification for freedom of religious thought and practice.” Id. He then insists, 
“once we accept that proposition, we can no longer consistently think . . . that religion is 
special and that other foundational ethical choices – about reproduction, marriage, and 
sexual orientation, for instance – may properly be subject to collective decision.” Id. 
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as grounded in religion.”75 (Again, I think a closer look at the religious 
landscape and studies of women’s decisionmaking could have revealed that 
religious ethics do factor into some decisions to have an abortion.) Dworkin 
refers back to his earlier attempt to argue for a substantive definition of 
religious convictions that would support a First Amendment approach to the 
abortion question: “Religions attempt to answer the deeper existential question 
by connecting individual lives to a transcendent objective value.”76 In that 
earlier argument, he wrote: “I can think of no plausible account of the content a 
belief must have, in order to be religious in character, that would rule out 
convictions about why and how human life has intrinsic objective 
importance.”77 In Religion Without God, he observes that the famous language 
from the Casey joint opinion – “[a]t the heart of liberty is the right to define 
one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the 
mystery of human life” – is similar in substance to his previously offered 
definition of religion.78 Dworkin concludes, however, “if, quite apart from the 
state of American constitutional law, we treat religious freedom as part of 
ethical independence, then the liberal position becomes mandatory.”79 
Dworkin directs readers who are dismayed by “this summary statement” to 
seek elaboration of his claims to Life’s Dominion.80 
Given that Dworkin only briefly treats the abortion issue in Religion Without 
God, and that I have previously engaged with his arguments in Life’s 
Dominion, I offer just a few comments about his claim that “the liberal 
position becomes mandatory” if one frames the issue as one of ethical 
independence.81 First, some prominent figures on the other side of this 
particular culture war – for example, natural law theorist Robert P. George – 
would strenuously resist any entitlement to ethical independence in this area, 
countering that taking seriously “the moral argument for the sanctity of human 
life in all stages and conditions,” reinforced by science, mandates respect and 
legal protection for even the earliest embryo.82 While the prolife movement, 
given that politics is “the art of the possible,” has “settled on an incrementalist 
 
75 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 144-45. 
76 Id. at 120-21 (citing RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 101 (1996)). That chapter of Freedom’s Law was originally 
published as a law review article that Dworkin incorporated, in revised form, into Life’s 
Dominion. Ronald Dworkin, Unenumerated Rights: Whether and How Roe Should Be 
Overruled, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 381 (1992). 
77 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 121 (citing DWORKIN, supra note 76, at 108). 
78 Id. at 122 (quoting Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992)). 
79 Id. at 144-45. 
80 Id. at 145 & n.19 (citing DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 21-22) (“I have argued for these 
claims in other work, and though even this summary statement will provoke dismay, I will 
not repeat or elaborate on my arguments here.”). 
81 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 144-45. 
82 GEORGE, supra note 18, at 93-95. 
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strategy for protecting nascent human life,” saving “many lives,” George 
articulates:  
Our foundational principle of the profound, inherent, and equal dignity of 
every human being demands that all members of the human family be 
respected and protected irrespective not only of race, sex, and ethnicity 
but also of age, size, location, stage of development, and condition of 
dependency. To exclude anyone from the law’s protection is to treat him 
unjustly.83 
In other words, what human dignity demands in the case of prenatal life is not 
a matter that can be left to a women’s exercise of ethical independence; the 
only morally true answer is protecting life from destruction. George and 
Dworkin have starkly different views of how dignity is at stake in women’s 
abortion decisions, since Dworkin views the abortion issue as one of ethics 
(whether a particular decision insults a woman’s dignity by not taking 
seriously the sanctity of life) rather than morality (that is, a moral duty to the 
fetus).84 In this regard, Jeremy Waldron’s critique of Life’s Dominion’s 
intervention into the “culture wars” over abortion by clarifying what the 
argument is really about may be equally apt of Dworkin’s effort, in Religion 
Without God, to reorient the “most divisive” abortion issue around the right to 
ethical independence: “This was a valiant attempt to find common ground in a 
series of intractable debates, though I am not sure that it convinced anyone 
who held what we conventionally call a religious view of euthanasia or 
abortion.”85 
 
83 Id. at 95 (emphasis added). I emphasize these three terms since they seem particularly 
directed to describe the condition of embryos and fetuses. 
84 In Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin clearly identified the regulation of abortion as one 
of ethics, not morality, indicating that the political community, via the Supreme Court, 
answered the moral question negatively, that is, whether a fetus has rights protecting its 
interest such that a woman has a “moral duty not to abort.” DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 377. 
Thus, Dworkin analyzes “dignity” with respect to the woman’s dignity, not that of prenatal 
life. He argues: “That right [to ethical independence] is violated and denied when 
government restricts freedom in order to enforce a collective ethical judgment – in this 
instance the ethical judgment that a woman who aborts an early pregnancy does not show 
the respect for human life that her dignity demands.” Id. at 377-78. 
85 Jeremy Waldron, Religion Without God by Ronald Dworkin – Review, 94 B.U. L. 
REV. 1207 (2014); see also Tribe, supra note 16, at 510 (“[I]n Dworkin’s conviction that the 
abortion controversy would be resolved if only people got the issues straight and made the 
distinctions that he thinks reason requires, he seems to me strangely blind to the deepest 
wellsprings of disagreement.”); Laurence H. Tribe, On the Edges of Life and Death, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 16, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/16/books/on-the-edges-of-life-and 
-death.html, archived at http://perma.cc/6WWK-7DBR. In her commentary on a draft of my 
Article, Itzel Mayans points out that, even if Dworkin and George might agree that the 
abortion issue implicates the sanctity of life, they translate that intrinsic value into policy in 
starkly different ways. 
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Second, it would be valuable to know how Dworkin would have assessed 
the emergence of the “regret” rationale – that women often come to regret their 
decisions to have abortions – as a justification for regulating and restricting 
abortion. This argument rests on a view of what makes life a success and of 
what obligations women owe to others. As I discuss elsewhere, the idea is that 
women naturally would want to preserve their relationship with their unborn 
child and that, if they do have an abortion, either a physician did not inform 
them fully of the consequences of abortion or they were pressured by a family 
member or partner. Supporters of this argument offer narratives of women’s 
lives that have gone badly after an abortion decision. On this view, in effect, 
women are incapable of choosing abortion, such that when they do choose it, 
society “cannot trust that women really are exercising full moral capacity, and 
are responsible for their decisions.”86 Thus, a “friend of the court” brief filed in 
Gonzales v. Carhart, in which the Supreme Court upheld a ban on a particular 
abortion method, contained many of these narratives and entirely rejected 
Casey’s premise that abortion is within the range of choices “central to 
personal dignity and autonomy” and “to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”87 The brief, filed on behalf of Sandra Cano, a plaintiff in a 
companion case to Roe v. Wade, instead contends that “abortion hurts women 
and endangers their physical, emotional, and psychological health.”88 
Acknowledging that there is “no reliable data to measure the phenomenon,” 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, cited the Cano brief in asserting that 
“women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created 
and sustained.” In upholding the ban on a method of abortion, he reasoned that 
women’s regret might be worse and their sorrow “more profound” if they later 
learned that their doctors did not fully inform them of the method of abortion 
used.89 This led Justice Ginsburg to chide him for invoking “an anti-abortion 
shibboleth for which [the majority] concededly has no reliable evidence” and 
to remind the majority of Casey’s language that “the destiny of the woman 
must be shaped . . . on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her 
place in society.”90 To put Ginsburg’s retort in Dworkin’s frame, the 
constitutional right Casey upheld protects ethical independence – a “woman’s 
autonomy to determine her life course.”91 As Jim Fleming and I argue, “the 
regret rationale reflects a lack of trust in women’s capacity for responsible 
moral agency, and a view that women are incompetent decision makers who 
 
86 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 52, at 69. 
87 Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
88 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 52, at 70 (quoting Brief of Sandra Cano, The Former 
“Mary Doe” of Doe v. Bolton et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 5, 21, 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (No. 05-380), 2006 WL 1436684). 
89 Gonzales, 550 U.S. at 159. 
90 Id. at 183 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
91 Id. at 171-72, 182-83. 
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need protection from their decision.”92 In actuality, questions of ethical and 
moral responsibility feature centrally in pregnant women’s decisionmaking; a 
“friend of the court” brief filed in Carhart in opposition to the ban, which 
presented women’s narratives, explained: “These women rely upon intimate 
moral, religious, and personal values to make the right decision for themselves 
and their families.”93 Thus, on the one hand, I wholly support Dworkin’s 
argument that a woman’s decision about pregnancy should be located within a 
frame of ethical independence. On the other hand, at this writing, it is hard to 
envision any philosophical intervention that could alter the current political 
and constitutional landscape concerning a right to procreative autonomy – 
where a woman’s right to ethical independence is challenged in ever more 
restrictive ways on the rationales both (1) of protecting women’s health, well-
being, and “right to know” (thus reducing the risk of “regret”), and (2) of 
protecting fetal life.94 
C. Is Democracy Possible Here?: Identifying Shared Principles About the 
Value and Responsibilities of a Human Life 
In Is Democracy Possible Here?: Principles for a New Political Debate, 
published after the 2004 presidential election in the United States and amidst 
talk of polarization, Dworkin tackled another contemporary form of “war”: 
American politics and the seemingly “deep, schismatic rift in the nation as a 
whole” into “incompatible all-embracing cultures,” or “red” versus “blue” 
states.95 Dworkin opened the book by observing the “appalling state” of 
American politics.96 He proposed to bridge the “supposedly unbridgeable 
divide” between red and blue states “to find the common ground that makes 
genuine argument among people of mutual respect possible and healing.”97 
People, he argued, share two “abstract, indeed philosophical, principles about 
the value and the central responsibilities of a human life” that involve 
dimensions of human dignity.98 Dworkin articulated these two principles in 
terms of the “objective” value of each human life: (1) once begun, “it matters 
 
92 FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 52, at 73. 
93 Id. at 74 (quoting Brief of the Institute for Reproductive Health Access et al. as Amici 
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 29, Gonzales, 550 U.S. 124 (Nos. 05-380, 05-1382), 
2006 WL 2736633). 
94 As I have written elsewhere, a problem with appealing to “responsibility” to defend 
abortion rights is that there is a gap between the reasons the public supports legal abortion 
and the reasons women most typically give for terminating their pregnancies. A woman’s 
calculus of the “responsible” or “right” thing to do given her circumstances will not be 
persuasive to people who view abortion as generally chosen for reasons of “convenience” or 
selfishness. See MCCLAIN, supra note 52, at 248-52. 
95 DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 1-2. 
96 Id. (“[O]ur politics are . . . a form of war.”). 
97 Id. at 5-7. 
98 Id. at 6-7. 
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how [a human life] goes,” and (2) the principle of personal responsibility – 
“each person has a special responsibility for realizing the success of his own 
life.”99 Those two dignity principles, he explained, form “what a government is 
required to do”: Dworkin elaborated on the implications of the first principle, 
drawing on his familiar idea that government must treat people with “equal 
concern”100 as a condition of political legitimacy. The second principle of 
human dignity, that “political arrangements must respect people’s personal 
responsibility for identifying value in their own lives,” maps onto a 
“partnership conception” of democracy, which recognizes limits to democratic 
self-government.101 As Dworkin argues: “It is inconsistent with someone’s 
dignity ever to submit to the coercive authority of others in deciding what role 
religious or comparable ethical values should play in his life, so the partnership 
conception requires some guarantee that the majority will not impose its will in 
these matters”; constitutional rights are, thus, “attempts to guarantee” that 
ethical freedom.102 
Dworkin submitted that once people understood that they shared these “deep 
principles about human value,” it will afford “common ground” to make 
national political debate on terms of mutual respect “possible and 
profitable.”103 Dworkin illustrated with examples of abortion, same-sex 
marriage, and religious liberty. I return to Dworkin’s analysis of marriage in 
the next Section, because it will make more sense after I examine his earlier 
work condemning legal prohibition of homosexual conduct in terms of liberal 
equality, ethical independence, and equality of resources. 
II. RELIGION WITHOUT GOD AS A FORM OF ETHICAL LIBERALISM 
In this Section, I point out the continuity between Dworkin’s prior work on 
ethical liberalism and his argument for key features in a “religious attitude” in 
Religion Without God. In particular, I observe his turn to liberal ethics, his 
appeal to art and the aesthetic as instructive on what it means to live life well, 
 
99 Id. at 9-10. 
100 Id. at 94-97, 144, 196. For Dworkin’s famous articulation of the right to equal 
concern and respect, see RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272-78 (1977). 
101 DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 145-47. 
102 Id. at 145-46. For further argument on why these dignity principles support the 
partnership conception of democracy, see DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 385-99. For a 
sympathetic evaluation, see Imer Flores, Ronald Dworkin’s Justice for Hedgehogs and 
Partnership Conception of Democracy (with a Comment to Jeremy Waldron’s “A Majority 
in the Lifeboat”), 4 PROBLEMA: ANUARIO DE FLIOSOFIA Y TEORIA DEL DERECHO 65, 98-102 
(2010). 
103 DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 6-8. Elsewhere, I evaluate Dworkin’s strategy for finding 
common ground by looking at debates over family law, specifically, the definition of 
marriage. See Linda C. McClain, Red Versus Blue (and Purple) States and the Same-Sex 
Marriage Debate: From Values Polarization to Common Ground?, 77 U. MO. KAN. CITY L. 
REV. 415, 435 (2008) (finding that Dworkin’s theory may be applied to state cases that 
consider the definition of marriage). 
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his emphasis on the role of personal responsibility in that ethics, and his 
insistence on value holism: the integration of ethics, morality, and justice (or, 
“political morality,” of which law is a branch104). Because Justice for 
Hedgehogs, Dworkin’s epic argument for “the unity of value,”105 has been the 
subject of extensive commentary,106 I focus primarily on some of the earlier 
roots of ethical liberalism. 
A. Ethical Liberalism: Liberal Community and Foundations of Liberal 
Equality 
In his 1989 essay, Liberal Community, Dworkin already was considering 
what makes a life go well and what improves or hinders one’s well-being.107 
He wrote that essay as a critique of Bowers v. Hardwick,108 in which the 
Supreme Court infamously upheld Georgia’s criminal prohibition on sodomy – 
as applied to homosexual sodomy – because the majority of Georgia 
presumably deemed homosexuality to be immoral.109 Dworkin advanced a 
distinction between “volitional” and “critical” well-being; the former “is 
improved whenever” someone “achieves something he wants.”110 The latter, 
critical well-being, is “improved only by his having or achieving those things 
that he should want, that is, achievements or experiences that it would make 
his life a worse one not to want.”111 Correspondently, he recognized two forms 
of paternalism: “volitional,” which “supposes that coercion can sometimes 
help people achieve what they already want to achieve, and is for that reason in 
their volitional interests”; and “critical,” which “supposes that coercion can 
sometimes provide people with lives that are better than the lives they now 
think good and coercion is therefore sometimes in their critical interests.”112 As 
a tool for evaluating paternalism and whether it could improve lives, Dworkin 
argued for a “constitutive view” of the “critical value of a life”: unless 
someone “endorses” a component of his life, the value of his life is not 
improved.113 Accordingly, “it is implausible to think that someone can lead a 
 
104 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 327-28, 400-09. 
105 Id. at 1 (“This book defends a large and old philosophical thesis: the unity of value.”). 
106 See, e.g., Symposium, Justice For Hedgehogs: A Conference on Ronald Dworkin’s 
Forthcoming Book, 90 B.U. L. REV. 465 (2010). 
107 Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 484-87, 502 (1989) 
(advancing “constitutive view” as way of “looking at the critical value of a life”). 
108 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
109 Id. at 196 (“The law . . . is constantly based on notions of morality, and if all laws 
representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated under the Due Process Clause, 
the courts will be very busy indeed.”). 
110 Dworkin, supra note 107, at 484. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 485. 
113 Id. at 486. 
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better life against the grain of his most profound ethical convictions.”114 Thus, 
on this view, if a person who is homosexual does not lead a homosexual life 
out of fear of punishment, and thus “never endorses the life he leads as 
superior to the life he would otherwise have led, then his life has not been 
improved” by the “paternalistic constraints he hates.”115 Dworkin further 
argued that “[t]hreats of criminal punishment corrupt rather than enhance 
critical judgment,” so that even if those threats “conver[ted]” someone away 
from homosexuality, such conversion “cannot be counted as genuine in 
deciding whether the threats have improved someone’s life.”116 
In his account of “ethical liberal[ism]” or the “challenge model,” 
Foundations of Liberal Equality (delivered as the Tanner Lectures in 1989, and 
published in 1990), Dworkin reiterated his disagreement with Bowers, and its 
conclusion that “a majority may properly make homosexuality a crime just 
because most people think homosexuals lead bad lives.”117 Returning to the 
example of political disagreement over whether homosexuals live good lives or 
not, he insisted that while people were free to “campaign for the good,” 
“[l]iberal equality denies them one weapon: even if they are in the majority, 
they must not forbid anyone to lead the life he wants, or punish him for doing 
so, just on the ground that they think his ethical convictions are wrong.”118 
(Here, Dworkin differentiates his strategy of “continuity” between ethics and 
politics and what he takes to be John Rawls’s strategy of discontinuity – that 
we should not bring our deepest convictions to bear in politics.119) 
At that time, Dworkin explained this limitation in terms of the demand of 
equality of “circumstances and resources,” because “[t]he law is plainly part of 
people’s circumstances, and circumstances are plainly unequal when the law 
forbids some to lead the lives they think best for them only because others 
disagree.”120 Again, Dworkin insisted that “ethical liberals” embraced 
tolerance, which “gives full force to their abstract ethical convictions about 
how they and others can live best.”121 One of those convictions is that 
“someone’s life cannot be improved against his steady conviction that it has 
not been.”122 
In Foundations of Liberal Equality, Dworkin also elaborated on the idea of 
“living well” in developing a “challenge” conception or model of ethics and 




116 Id. at 486-87. 
117 Dworkin, supra note 11, at 112-14. 
118 Id. at 114-15. 
119 See id. at 20-22, 24 (discussing JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)). 
120 Id. at 115. 
121 Id. at 116. 
122 Id. 
123 Id. at 7-8 (distinguishing the “challenge” from the “impact” model and arguing that 
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aesthetic. Dworkin observes that the “model of challenge” – by contrast to the 
“impact model” – “adopts Aristotle’s view that a good life has the inherent 
value of a skillful performance,” a value that holds whether or not that 
performance has any “impact beyond the life in which [it] occur[s].”124 
Dworkin gives a number of examples of artistic creation, suggesting that art is 
a “better analogy to living, according to the challenge model” than something 
like mountain climbing or diving.125 Pertinent to his later work on a religious 
attitude, he stresses that “if living well is regarded as a challenge, defining 
what it is to live well must be part of that challenge too.”126 For “[a]rtists are 
not furnished with blueprints,” and “[t]here is no settled view about what 
artistic achievement is,” as perhaps there is about achievement in diving.127 
Both art and ethics, Dworkin contends, “call for a decision, as part of the 
challenge they present, about the right response to the complex circumstances 
in which the decision must be made,” and a further question, “in both cases,” is 
“what the right response for any particular artist or person in any particular 
circumstances actually is, or whether there is a single right response even for a 
particular person or circumstance or only a set of these.”128 
Clearly, as I suggest in Part III, this idea of ethics differs from a model of 
religious ethics rooted in divine revelation and “dictates” of conscience. 
Notably, Dworkin closes his Tanner Lectures with an Epilogue stating that he 
does not mean “that religious or utilitarian ethics can have no place in the 
model of challenge.”129 Instead, he observes: 
The idea that living skillfully means recognizing and entering into an 
appropriate relationship with some conception of God, or that it means 
recognizing and responding to human misery, are not only possible 
interpretations of the challenge model but, for many people, compelling 
interpretations of it. I mean only that many of the political implications 
people have drawn from theological or utilitarian ethics make sense only 
if these are understood on the different model of impact.130 
B. The Challenge Model and Value Holism: Justice for Hedgehogs 
In Justice for Hedgehogs, Dworkin argues for the integration of ethics, 
personal morality, and political morality, arguing that law is a branch of 
 
“[s]omeone lives well,” on the challenge account of ethical value, “by having a decent sense 
of the assignment he faces in living—a decent sense of his own ethical identity—and 
leading that life out of that sense”). 
124 Id. at 57. 
125 Id. at 64. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 66. 
129 Id. at 119. 
130 Id. 
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morality, broadly understood.131 There are many ideas in that rich book, and I 
previously have written about some of them.132 Here, I just observe that 
Dworkin carries forward in Justice for Hedgehogs his basic methods of 
appealing to readers’ intuitions to explain principles they share and of drawing 
analogies to art and to performance to explain the importance – indeed, the 
challenge – of living well. To the central question, “[h]ow, then, should we 
live?,” for example, Dworkin answers: “We must treat the making of our lives 
as a challenge, one we can perform well or badly.”133 Dworkin refers to the 
Romantics’ idea of making one’s life a work of art in referring to “the art of 
living,” and to living life well as a skillful performance.134 Also carried 
forward is his argument that a life lived well has “adverbial” value, whether or 
not it has actual impact on others.135 
Principles of dignity – of self-respect and of authenticity – entail that each 
person has a “special . . . responsibility for identifying what counts as success 
in his own life” and for creating a “coherent narrative” of his life, a life he has 
chosen and endorsed.136 This theme of endorsement dates back to his 1989 
article, Liberal Community.137 Pertinent to Religion Without God, he makes 
clear in his discussion of truth and objective value that he does not rely on a 
model resting on divine revelation or on the premise that a personal god is the 
ultimate source of morality.138 Utilizing distinctions he pursues in that later 
work, he distinguishes between the domains of fact (“if any god does exist”) 
and value (“[a]ny god’s moral authority, if this exists”), and that one must 
construct a principled account for such moral authority, rather than treating it 
as “just a moral fact.”139 Truth, like the other central concepts that Dworkin 
discusses in Justice for Hedgehogs – such as dignity, liberty, equality, and 
 
131 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 405. 
132 See Linda C. McClain, Justice and Elegance for Hedgehogs – In Life, Law, and 
Literature, 90 B.U. L. REV. 863, 866-67 (2010). I argue that Dworkin’s book might be 
considered “a work in ‘law and literature’” because of its focus on interpretation and on 
narrative and comparing it with Muriel Barbery’s best-selling novel, The Elegance of the 
Hedgehog. See id. (citing MURIEL BARBERY, THE ELEGANCE OF THE HEDGEHOG (Alison 
Anderson trans., Europa Editions 2008) (2006)). 
133 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 13. 
134 Id. at 198-99 (“If we want to make sense of a life having meaning, we must take up 
the Romantic’s analogy.”). 
135 Id. at 197 (“We value human lives well lived not for the completed narrative, as if 
fiction would do as well, but because they too embody a performance: a rising to the 
challenge of having a life to lead. The final value of our lives is adverbial, not adjectival.”). 
136 Id. at 204. 
137 Dworkin, supra note 107, at 485-86 (arguing for a “constitutive” view of the critical 
value of a life on which “no component contributes to the value of a life without 
endorsement”). 
138 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 173 (“We can rescue philosophical arguments about the 
nature of truth if we can understand truth as an interpretive concept.”). 
139 Id. at 343. For similar discussion in Religion Without God, see infra Part III. 
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democracy – is an interpretive concept.140 Morally responsible people have the 
interpretive task of achieving integrity as they interpret – thus accepting their 
special responsibility for their own lives – what principles of authenticity and 
self-respect require in their lives.141 Pertinent to Dworkin’s later argument 
about the “value” component of the religious attitude, he links ethics and 
morality through the concept of responsibility: “[W]hat people must do for 
their own sake or for others.”142 Translated into political morality, individuals 
have a right to ethical independence – to define ethical value for themselves, 
with corresponding limits on government’s use of coercive power when it 
violates their ethical independence143 (as I elaborate in discussing the marriage 
example that follows). 
C. Personal Responsibility, Anticompulsion, and the Ethical Environment: 
The Regulation of Same-Sex Marriage 
Several years after Dworkin’s critique of Bowers, first in the context of 
reproductive liberty in Casey and then in the overruling of Bowers in 
Lawrence, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the idea that governmental 
compulsion precludes the formation of belief in a manner that is consistent 
with respecting personhood. Dworkin favorably quotes the following passage 
from Casey in Life’s Dominion and does so later in Religion Without God: “At 
the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these 
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they formed under 
compulsion of the State.”144 
In overruling Bowers and recognizing a constitutional right of gay men and 
lesbians to same-sex intimate association, Lawrence reiterated this 
anticompulsion principle, observing that constitutional “[l]iberty presumes an 
autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and 
certain intimate conduct.”145 Lawrence also repeated Casey’s idea that people 
of good conscience disagree about the morality of homosexuality – as they do 
about what “responsibility” means with respect to human reproduction – and 
that the Supreme Court should not impose its own “moral code,” but “uphold 
the liberty of all.”146 The Court’s rhetoric in these two cases about liberty and 
autonomy and the beliefs that define “the attributes of personhood” resonates, 
as Dworkin observes, with Dworkin’s idea of ethical independence and of each 
 
140 On interpretive concepts, see DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 156-70. On truth as such a 
concept, see id. at 172-78. 
141 Id. at 99-117. 
142 Id. at 327-28. 
143 Id. at 368-69. 
144 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992). 
145 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562. 
146 Id. at 571 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850). 
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individual’s special responsibility “to identify the value and point of human 
life and the relationships, achievements, and experiences that would realize 
that value in his own life.”147 
In Liberal Community, Dworkin rejected the idea that a political 
community’s “communal life” should extend to a “national” or “communal sex 
life.”148 He contended that “it is deeply implausible that the characterization of 
communal life that best fits” a community made up of “[p]eople of every race, 
faith, and ambition . . . could be one that assumes that it must choose one faith 
or set of personal ambitions or ethnic allegiance, or one set of standards of 
sexual responsibility, as a healthy individual person must.”149 Thus, contrary to 
Bowers, “neither the United States nor its several states are communities that 
have a communal sex life, and . . . the argument from integration, used to 
justify illiberal political decisions by and across those political communities, 
accordingly fails.”150 In this respect, the Supreme Court seemed to concur with 
Dworkin when, in Lawrence, it affirmed a realm of autonomy in which 
consensual, intimate sexual conduct between adults may not be punished 
merely because a majority believes it is immoral. Liberty, the Lawrence Court 
stated, assumed an “autonomy of self,” and the Court observed that there was 
an “emerging awareness” of such autonomy concerning intimate life.151 This 
runs counter to a presupposition of a nation with a communal sex life. 
Is marriage different? Lawrence specifically did not address the issue of 
civil recognition of intimate relationships, although Justice O’Connor stated in 
concurrence that government has reasons, beyond mere moral disapproval, to 
protect the institution of marriage.152 As I elaborate elsewhere, “[i]n the 
political order, families are simultaneously a site of private life and an 
institution of public importance because of the goods they foster and the 
functions they serve.”153 As the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court well 
expressed it in Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, “[m]arriage is a 
vital social institution” with significant public and private dimensions.154 In 
contrast to government refraining from interfering with private individual 
sexual conduct – protected in Lawrence as part of due process liberty – 
 
147 DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 71-72 (referring to the Court’s language first in Casey and 
then in Lawrence); see also DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 369 (quoting the passage to 
illustrate dignity and a right to ethical independence); DWORKIN, supra note 2, at 152-54, 
171-72 (referring to the joint opinion’s rhetoric in Casey). 
148 Dworkin, supra note 107, at 497-98. 
149 Id. 
150 Id. at 498. 
151 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562, 571-72. 
152 Id. at 585 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Unlike the moral disapproval of same-sex 
relations – the asserted state interest in this case – other reasons exist to promote the 
institution of marriage beyond mere moral disapproval of an excluded group.”). 
153 MCCLAIN, supra note 52, at 22. 
154 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
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government must take affirmative actions to create and recognize a civil 
marriage. Marriage entails liberty in the sense not only of “freedom from” 
unwarranted governmental interference with intimate association but also of 
“freedom to” marry the partner of one’s choice and to governmental 
recognition of that union.155 
How does a general right to ethical independence apply with respect to 
marriage? Are the laws regulating marriage tantamount to specifying a nation’s 
“communal sex life”? Do they violate Dworkin’s insistence that the ethical 
environment “be created under the aegis of ethical independence: that it be 
created organically by the decisions of millions of people with the freedom to 
make their own choices, not through political majorities imposing their 
decisions on everyone[?]”156 What is the proper mix between the realm of 
ethical independence – the environment created by numerous individual 
choices – and the realm of political morality – collective decision making in 
shaping marriage as a social and legal institution? 
Over a century ago, the Supreme Court famously, or infamously, declared, 
in Reynolds v. United States157 and subsequent cases upholding federal laws 
targeting polygamy, that the United States rested on monogamous marriage, 
while polygamy undergirded despotism: 
Marriage, while from its very nature a sacred obligation, is nevertheless, 
in most civilized nations, a civil contract, and usually regulated by law. 
Upon it society may be said to be built, and out of its fruits spring social 
relations and social obligations and duties, with which government is 
necessarily required to deal. In fact, according as monogamous or 
polygamous marriages are allowed, do we find the principles on which 
the government of the people, to a greater or less extent, rests. Professor 
Lieber says, polygamy leads to the patriarchal principle, and which, when 
applied to large communities, fetters the people in stationary despotism, 
while that principle cannot long exist in connection with monogamy.158 
In other words, “the very government a society enjoys, whether despotic or 
republican, grows out of the form of marriage a society permits.”159 
While Reynolds certainly has its critics, for its “orientalism” and its 
trenching on the Establishment Clause,160 it is notable that Goodridge, over a 
 
155 Id. at 959. 
156 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 371. 
157 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
158 Id. at 165-66. 
159 MARK E. BRANDON, STATES OF UNION: FAMILY AND CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 205 (2013) (discussing Reynolds and subsequent cases). 
Elsewhere, I review Brandon’s informative book. See Linda C. McClain, Book Review, 
Common and Uncommon Families and the American Constitutional Order, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. EN BANC 19 (2014). 
160 See BRANDON, supra note 159, at 206 (observing critically “several items of irony and 
interest” in Reynolds, including “the Court’s invocation of the sacred to limit religiously 
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century later, reiterated the role of law in setting the terms of the marriage 
contract: 
In a real sense, there are three partners to every civil marriage: two 
willing spouses and an approving State. While only the parties can 
mutually assent to marriage the terms of the marriage – who may marry 
and what obligations, benefits, and liability attach to civil marriage – are 
set by the Commonwealth.161 
How, then, should a right to ethical independence feature in an account of 
governmental authority to define and regulate marriage? Is marriage an 
interpretive concept? Is there a “truth” about what the best conception of 
marriage is, which the political community may support? Or is the liberal 
answer instead broad tolerance of diverse views about what marriage is and 
what it means? What happens when people disagree?162 
Religion Without God refers to Dworkin’s prior analysis in Is Democracy 
Possible Here? in support of his argument that a right to ethical independence 
makes “mandatory” the “liberal position” on “gender equality in marriage.”163 
I have analyzed that argument in other writing,164 and so I just briefly 
recapitulate it, suggesting the continuity with his overall account of ethical 
liberalism and asking how it bears on the project of “religion without God.” In 
Is Democracy Possible Here?, Dworkin frames the issue of access by gay men 
and lesbians to marriage as posing distributional and liberty questions. 
Recognizing that marriage is a social institution, he writes that marriage is “a 
social resource of irreplaceable value,” and submits that unequal access to it 
cannot be justified.165 Dworkin characterizes certain arguments made against 
extending marriage to same-sex couples – such as promoting optimal child 
rearing – as reflecting a “judgmental religious perspective” that is “belied by 
 
motivated action”); see also Brown v. Buhman, 947 F. Supp. 2d 1170, 1181-82 (D. Utah 
2013) (striking down the “cohabitation” prong of Utah’s criminal bigamy statutes and 
questioning continued vitality of Reynolds given that “the Supreme Court has over decades 
[since Reynolds] assumed a general posture that is less inclined to allow majoritarian 
coercion of unpopular or disliked minority groups, especially when blatant racism (as 
expressed through Orientalism/imperialism), religious prejudice, or some other 
constitutionally suspect motivation, can be discovered behind such legislation”). 
161 Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (citations 
omitted). 
162 I return to this in Part III.B, in examining Robert George’s argument against changing 
civil law to allow same-sex couples to marry. 
163 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 145. 
164 McClain, supra note 103, at 436-37 (arguing that “[o]ne limitation of Dworkin’s 
theory is that it focuses primarily on the individual,” and that, although “[i]t speaks of 
marriage as a unique resource and a social institution,” it “does not centrally engage with the 
family as a social institution, with regulation of the family, or with competing visions of 
family at stake in the red/blue divide”). 
165 DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 86. 
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the practice, in Massachusetts as well as other states, of permitting unmarried 
same-sex couples to adopt children.”166 
Dworkin concluded that the most sympathetic rendering of “[t]he case 
against gay marriage” was the following: 
[T]he institution of marriage is . . . a unique and immensely valuable 
cultural resource. Its meaning and hence its value have accreted 
organically over centuries, and the assumption that marriage is the union 
of a man and a woman is so embedded in its meaning that it would 
become a different institution, and hence a less valuable institution, were 
that assumption now challenged and lost. Just as we might struggle to 
maintain the meaning and value of any other great natural or artistic 
resource, so we should struggle to retain this uniquely valuable cultural 
resource.167 
Dworkin then made an interesting move, suggesting that if one substitutes 
“religion” for “marriage” in the above argument, one would see that religion’s 
meaning has changed over time, due to many “organic processes” (such as the 
development of new religions) as well as due to “new threats to established 
doctrine and practice” because of secular theories of science, politics, or social 
justice.168 So, too, religion’s cultural meaning shifts as “[p]eople’s sense of 
what religion is” alters as a result of social movements (such as feminism) and 
“a thousand other shifts in religious impulse that began in individual decisions 
and ended in seismic changes in what religion can and does mean.”169 
Dworkin then moved from religion to marriage: religious conservatives, he 
contended, do not advocate freezing the cultural meaning of religion “by laws 
prohibiting people with new visions from access to the title, legal status, or tax 
and economic benefits of religious organization.”170 But when they make a 
“cultural argument against gay marriage,” they assume – mistakenly – that “the 
culture that shapes our values is the property only of some of us – those who 
happen to enjoy political power for the moment – to sculpt and protect in the 
shape we admire.”171 In a “genuinely free society,” however, liberty and the 
personal responsibility it protects insist that “the world of ideas and values 
belong to no one and to everyone.”172 This argument is similar to Dworkin’s 
argument against governmental coercion of the ethical environment. 
As I now address, some prominent religious opponents of marriage equality 
do not believe that the definition – and hence the meaning – of marriage should 
be permitted to change, and contend that to permit such change would be a 
 
166 Id. at 87 (discussing arguments in Justice Cordy’s dissenting opinion in Goodridge). 
167 Id. at 87-88. 
168 Id. at 88. 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 89. 
172 Id. 
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denial of the “truth” of what marriage is. Is Dworkin’s framing of the marriage 
issue as one of a right to ethical independence a persuasive way to meet that 
argument? 
III. WILL DWORKIN’S “PRAYER” BE ANSWERED?: CAN HIS RELIGION 
WITHOUT GOD REDUCE CONFLICT OVER RELIGIOUS LIBERTY? 
Dworkin argues in Religion Without God that “a little philosophy might 
help” to “shrink both the size and the importance” of the “new religious wars” 
in the United States.173 Dworkin rejects the idea of a “special right to religion,” 
echoing his argument in Justice for Hedgehogs that the appeal to “special 
rights and obligations,” rooted in “racial, ethnic, religious, and linguistic 
connections . . . has been and remains a powerful source of evil.”174 Indeed, 
passages in that earlier book about people “killing each other and destroying 
their communities in the name of some supposed group right or destiny”175 
preview his concern in Religion Without God: “Religious war is, like cancer, a 
curse of our species. People kill each other, around the world, because they 
hate each other’s gods. In less violent places like America they fight mainly in 
politics, at every level from national elections to local school board 
meetings.”176 
As introduced in Part I, Dworkin’s philosophical intervention into this “war” 
is that “logic requires a separation between the scientific and value parts of 
orthodox godly religion,” which allows us to see that theists and atheists share 
a religious attitude.177 Turning to constitutional law, Dworkin then proposes to 
reorient the understanding of religious freedom to include “religious atheism,” 
or “religion without god,” so that the core issue is “ethical independence,” 
which requires certain limits on governmental restriction of that freedom.178 
In this Part, I evaluate (1) whether Dworkin’s conception of “religion 
without god” is likely to persuade theists, and (2) whether his proposed shift 
from a special right to religious freedom to a general right to ethical 
independence is likely to lead to “religious liberty without conflict,” or at least 
to less conflict. Or is this latest Dworkinian intervention another overly “sunny 
assumption that reason [will] dissolve the deepest differences underlying our 
legal and especially our constitutional outlooks”?179 
I first identify several lines of criticism that religious theists might direct 
toward Dworkin’s argument.180 I also contrast Dworkin’s argument, both on 
 
173 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 9-10. 
174 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 324. 
175 Id. 
176 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 7-8. 
177 Id. at 9. 
178 Id. at 129-37. 
179 Tribe, supra note 16, at 510. 
180 As I discuss later, contributors to this Symposium make some of the criticisms I 
anticipate. See Stephen D. Smith, Is God Irrelevant?, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1339 (2014). 
  
2014] RELIGIOUS LIBERTY WITHOUT CONFLICT 1299 
 
the religious attitude and on the liberal position on marriage becoming 
mandatory, with that of Robert P. George. This comparison is apt for three 
reasons. First, just as Dworkin offers interventions into culture wars, George 
contends that the deep divisions among Americans over a range of issues 
“involve disputed fundamental values and moral principles” and proposes to 
look deeply and critically at underlying “philosophical assumptions . . . about 
the human good, human nature, human dignity, and many other crucial 
matters.”181 Second, George’s natural law approach separates reason and 
revelation, insisting that, while “God can reveal moral truths, . . . many moral 
truths, including some that are revealed, can also be grasped by ethical 
reflection apart from revelation.”182 Nonetheless, George’s account of religion 
suggests that he would reject sharply much of Dworkin’s account. Moreover, 
while Dworkin contends that the “liberal position” on abortion rights and 
same-sex marriage “becomes mandatory” if one accepts his recasting of 
religious freedom,183 George argues that “[t]he defense of life against abortion” 
and “[t]he defense of marriage” are “among the most urgent causes” that 
“spring from the foundational moral purposes of law and the state.”184 Third, 
and related to this point, George, a prominent conservative Christian 
academic,185 has taken a highly visible public role, not only through his 
published writing and friend of the court briefs (including with coauthors Ryan 
Anderson and Sherif Girgis), but also as a leader in various organizations, in 
opposing changing civil law to allow same-sex couples to marry on the basis 
that the “truth” about marriage requires defending traditional marriage.186 
 
181 GEORGE, supra note 18, at ix-x. 
182 Id. at 83. 
183 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 145. 
184 GEORGE, supra note 18, at 105. 
185 See David D. Kirkpatrick, The Conservative-Christian Big Thinker, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
16, 2009 (Magazine), at 24 (characterizing George as “this country’s most influential 
conservative Christian thinker”). 
186 See GEORGE, supra note 18, at 96-105, 126-46 (elucidating George’s definition of 
marriage). George was a coauthor of the Manhattan Declaration, which puts forth a 
religiously grounded defense of traditional marriage. See Kirkpatrick, supra note 185, at 24. 
He is also coauthor of another, related book, see SHERIF GIRGIS ET AL., WHAT IS MARRIAGE? 
MAN AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE (2012), and coauthor with Anderson and Girgis of an amicus 
curiae brief in the recent U.S. Supreme Court litigation over the Defense of Marriage Act 
and Proposition 8, see Brief for Robert P. George et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondents, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 786 (2012) (No. 12-144); United States v. 
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307), 2013 WL 390984. He is also the past 
chairman of the National Organization for Marriage, which actively opposes efforts in the 
legislative and judicial arenas to revise marriage laws, and helped found and is a fellow of 
the Witherspoon Institute, which has issued various reports defending traditional marriage 
laws against revision. See THE WITHERSPOON INST., MARRIAGE AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: TEN 
PRINCIPLES (2008), archived at http://perma.cc/8XFP-EKH3; Fellows, THE WITHERSPOON 
INST., http:winst.org/fellows (last visited May 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/K86X-
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Further, he argues that marriage itself and religious liberty are threatened by 
such changes.187 In Religion Without God, Dworkin observes in his chapter on 
religious freedom, that “what is undoubtedly the most divisive issue of all” is 
“sexual and reproductive morality,”188 by which he means abortion and 
“gender equality in marriage”189 (or same-sex marriage). 
A. Criticisms of Dworkin’s Philosophy of Religion 
One likely criticism that theists will make of Dworkin’s philosophy of 
religion is that a relationship to a personal god is at the core of both the 
“science” and “value” components of religion and cannot be severed in the 
way Dworkin proposes. Having a relationship with the divine is one significant 
dimension of living well, or having a successful life. One reason, as Steven 
Smith articulates in this Symposium, is that in religious interpretations of 
morality, “the ultimate fulfillment” of such morality “is thought to inhere in a 
loving relationship with God himself,” who is a “Friend with whom it is a 
supreme joy to be.”190 In this sense, Smith argues, theistic morality is 
“subjective” because of a belief in a personal God, a “transcendent Person, 
whose essence is Love.”191 
Further, obedience to or living in conformity with the commandments of a 
personal god is precisely what, for many religious believers, living well or 
living a successful life means. What supplies the content of “living well” if not 
religious teachings (teachings often attributed to divine command or 
revelation)? Consider the many biblical verses that link obedience to God’s 
commands to life “going well” (for example, Deuteronomy 5:16, “Honor your 
father and your mother, as the Lord your God commanded you, so that your 
days may be long and that it may go well with you in the land that the Lord 
your God is giving you”).192 Consider, in the Jewish tradition, the word 
 
57EQ; see also Leadership, NAT’L ORG. FOR MARRIAGE, https://nationformarriage.org/about 
/leadership (last visited Apr. 2, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/BP8W-855X. In addition, 
Robert George is the chair of the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, an 
appointment viewed as highlighting “the Catholic scholar’s striking influence on 
Washington policy debates, spanning global human rights as well as marriage and pro-life 
advocacy.” Joan Frawley Desmond, Robert George to Head U.S. Commission on 
International Religious Freedom, NAT’L CATH. REGISTER (July 25, 2013, 7:58 AM), http:// 
www.ncregister.com/site/print_article/38319, archived at http://perma.cc/SDG8-8UNN. 
187 See, e.g., Robert P. George, Marriage and Politics, NAT’L REV., Feb. 11, 2013, at 34 
(“If marriage is redefined, believing what virtually every human society once believed about 
marriage – that it is a male-female union – will be seen increasingly as a malicious 
prejudice, to be driven to the margins of culture. The consequences for observant Christians, 
Jews, Muslims, and others are becoming apparent.”). 
188 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 144. 
189 Id. at 144-45. 
190 Smith, supra note 180, at 1352-53. 
191 Id. at 1355. 
192 Deuteronony 5:16. 
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“halakhah” (literally, “to go” or “to walk”), associated with the entire system 
of Jewish law as it applies to everyday life: “In the Bible the good life is 
frequently spoken of as a way in which men are ‘to go,’” and the ultimate 
source of the law given to Moses on Sinai.193 Halakhah is “the ‘way’ a Jew is 
directed to behave in every aspect of life, encompassing civil, criminal, and 
religious law.”194 Similarly, in Islam, the third Abrahamic religion, the term 
“shari’ a” refers to a “total way of life,” the “path of correct conduct that God 
has revealed through his messengers, particularly the prophet Muhammad.”195 
“[F]or Abrahamic religions,” one reviewer has suggested, “God is the 
creator and the ultimate source of morality and, therefore, religion is a source 
of both individual and collective value.”196 For this reason, Dworkin’s 
disaggregation of the religious attitude from a personal god may be a 
stumbling block for many to accepting his argument. For example, theological 
perspectives and religious ethics rooted in ideas about God as creator and 
about the moral significance of the created order, which reflects God’s 
purposes and design,197 are likely to object strongly to the following claim 
Dworkin makes: 
Human life cannot have any kind of meaning or value just because a 
loving god exists. The universe cannot be intrinsically beautiful just 
because it was created to be beautiful. Any judgment about meaning in 
human life or wonder in nature relies ultimately not only on descriptive 
truth, no matter how exalted or mysterious, but finally on more 
fundamental value judgments. There is no direct bridge from any story 
about the creation of the firmament, or the heavens and earth, or the 
animals of the sea and the land, or the delights of heaven, or the fires of 
hell, or the parting of any sea or the raising of any dead, to the enduring 
value of friendship and family or the importance of charity or the 
sublimity of a sunset or the appropriateness of awe in the face of the 
universe or even a duty of reverence for a creator god.198 
 
193 See Halakhah: Definition, JEWISH VIRTUAL LIBRARY, http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary. 
org/jsource/judaica/ejud_0002_0008_0_08206.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/AKK3-58BS; Halakhah: Jewish Law, MY JEWISH LEARNING, http://www. 
myjewishlearning.com/practices/Ritual/Jewish_Practices/Halakhah_Jewish_Law_.shtml 
(last visited May 14, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/FL89-ZRGK. 
194 Halakhah: Jewish Law, supra note 193. 
195 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ISLAM AND THE MUSLIM WORLD 618 (Richard C. Martin ed., 2004). 
196 Rafael Domingo, Religion for Hedgehogs? An Argument Against the Dworkinian 
Approach to Religious Freedom, 2 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 371, 390 (2012) (discussing 
Justice for Hedgehogs and the draft lectures for Religion Without God). 
197 See Smith, supra note 180, at 1355 (arguing that in the Jewish and Christian 
traditions, “life and the universe are the creation of, and are governed by, a mindful and 
loving Person . . . . [T]he whole is suffused with purpose and love”). 
198 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 24-25. 
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Contrast this passage from Dworkin with the Genesis account of creation, 
where God “saw everything that he had made, and indeed, it was very 
good,”199 and the Genesis story in which God said, “[l]et us make mankind in 
our image, according to our likeness,”200 and then blessed the males and 
females he created instructing them to “[b]e fruitful and multiply” and to “fill 
the earth and subdue it” and “have dominion” over every living thing.201 For 
many religion scholars and believers, the idea of being made “in the image of 
God” permeates their religious beliefs and approach to their place in the world. 
It is the foundation of human dignity.202 
No doubt some contemporary theologians have modern and postmodern 
forms of theology that do not premise all of religious ethics upon creation. 
Nonetheless, the radical severance Dworkin proposes between the “science” 
part of religion – belief in a “personal god” or an idea of divine creation – and 
the “value” component of the religious attitude may be rough going for many 
religious believers, who “think that the universe, including the world of 
humanity, is the product of a loving and intelligent Author or Designer who 
created it according to a plan and for a good purpose.”203 Indeed, one critique 
suggests that while Dworkin introduced his idea of religion without god to 
include “religious atheists,” his “understanding of religion renders irrelevant 
the theistic aspects of the great monotheistic religions,” leading some to worry 
about “what the terms of the peace treaty” in the new wars over religion will 
be.204 Stanley Fish contends that Religion Without God continues the liberal 
project of “dismantling or bracketing the scaffolding of a religious edifice with 
God as its foundation and apex” and “building from scratch a new edifice that 
will be furnished with meanings and values as powerful and justified as those 
[liberals] relinquished when they relinquished theism.”205 Fish concludes of 
this liberal project: “Religion so reduced to a general (nondoctrinal, 
nonceremonial) conviction of the meaning of life without any account of its 
origin is perfectly acceptable to liberalism because it is liberalism.”206 
 
199 Genesis 1:31. 
200 Id. 1:26. 
201 Id. 1:27. Below, I discuss the role Genesis plays in arguments for the conjugal model 
of marriage. 
202 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, TOWARD A THEORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS: RELIGION, LAW, 
COURTS (2007) (advancing the argument that morality of human rights is based on religious 
ground of human dignity); John Behr, The Promise of the Image, in IMAGO DEI: HUMAN 
DIGNITY IN ECUMENICAL PERSPECTIVE 15, 16 (Thomas Albert Howard ed., 2013) (“Now 
what from a Christian perspective marks out the dignity of human beings is that, unlike the 
rest of creation (and even the angels), they alone are created in the image and likeness of 
God.”). 
203 Smith, supra note 180, at 1355. 
204 Robert T. Miller, Dogmatic Philosophy, 240 FIRST THINGS 59, 60-61 (2014). 
205 Fish, supra note 19. 
206 Id. 
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Religious critics may question whether an ethical responsibility to “live 
well” or to make a success of one’s life sufficiently maps onto religious 
understandings of what it means to live a good life. Is living well a broad 
enough umbrella concept that it can embrace “living according to religious 
teachings” or, as it is sometimes put, to religious “dictates”? The ethical 
individualism model seems to emphasize self-direction and the individual 
constructing a successful life. For Dworkin, aesthetic images of self-creation 
are a ready analogy for making a success of one’s life. Thus, in the concluding 
pages of Religion Without God, he harkens back to “the Romantic poets” who 
“said we should try to make our lives into works of art,” suggesting that “what 
they said can be applied to any life someone self-consciously leads supposing 
it to be a life lived well according to a plausible view of what that means.”207 
Here, Dworkin references his earlier words in Justice for Hedgehogs about 
how someone “creates a work of art from his life,” analogizing the satisfaction 
one feels from doing “something smaller well” – an achievement “within life” 
– to thinking of one’s overall life as “an achievement complete in itself, with 
its own value in the art in living it displays.”208 
What some religious critics may find lacking in this account of living well 
as a work of art is any place for religious doctrine or religious community in 
shaping one’s beliefs and practices about living a successful life. The zealous 
insistence on the right – and responsibility – of the individual to find value for 
himself may be at odds with a value holism by which an individual finds value 
in being part of a broader interpretive community. How does Dworkin’s view 
of an individual, within an integrated approach to ethics and morality, compare 
to a theist’s, or believer’s view? The interpretive challenge in Dworkin’s world 
is faced by the individual, who, to meet that challenge, even if a religious 
believer, should not live an unexamined life. In Justice for Hedgehogs, for 
example, Dworkin argues: “You do not live as well as you might if you have 
never had occasion to reflect on what living well means for you in your 
situation.”209 He adds: “For many people a good life is one observant in a 
particular religion. They may be right or wrong in the cosmology this assumes, 
but in either case their lives lack full dignity if they have never even pondered 
that cosmology.”210 
Dworkin also argues that, pursuant to dignity principles, the individual may 
be subject to influence, but “[w]e may not subordinate ourselves to the will of 
other human beings” in making decisions about the success of our lives.211 
Does feeling bound by the claims of – or agreeing to the interpretive authority 
of – a normative community or text ever cross the line from influence to 
 
207 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 157-58. 
208 Id. at 158 (quoting DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 198-99). 
209 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 420. 
210 Id. 
211 DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 10, 17. 
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subordination?212 Or do sanctions employed by a religious community cross 
such a line? Contemporary battles over orthodoxy and heterodoxy illustrate 
that a component of some contemporary religions is an idea that some choices 
about how to live are off the table as forbidden by a religion. The controversies 
over sexual and reproductive morality, to which Dworkin refers, illustrate 
this.213 
In a criticism both of Justice for Hedgehogs and the manuscript of Religion 
Without God, Rafael Domingo of University of Navarra argues that Dworkin’s 
focus on the “unity of value” is “incomplete because it is not based on the 
‘unity of the person,’” as religion is.214 The unity of the person, Domingo 
argues, integrates three dimensions: the individual, the social, and the 
transcendent.215 While ethical individualism stresses the special responsibility 
of each person for his or her life, the social (or “we”) dimension of religion 
includes the relationship to other persons, and the transcendent dimension 
pertains to a relationship with God.216 Domingo’s formulation integrates what 
 
212 Dworkin suggests that deferring to the judgments of a particular religious text or 
religious leader is a permissible form of influence rather than subordination. Id. at 17 (“We 
must be careful to distinguish subordination so defined from a variety of ways in which 
others may influence us that do not involve subordination and that this principal of dignity 
therefore does not condemn.”). 
213 Whether particular denominations should allow same-sex couples to marry religiously 
is a contentious issue in some religious communities, with some churches excommunicating 
or defrocking clergy who perform such ceremonies, as well as religious groups calling for 
religious sanctions against pro-gay-marriage politicians. See, e.g., Anitra Kitts, Synod PJC 
Upholds Sphar’s Conviction on Same-Sex Wedding Charge, PRESBYTERIAN CHURCH (Mar. 
31, 2011), https://www.pcusa.org/news/2011/3/31/synod-pjc-upholds-spahrs-conviction-
same-sex-weddi, archived at http://perma.cc/84S5-AHWA; Gabrielle Levy, Church 
Defrocks Minister for Officiating Son’s Gay Wedding, UNITED PRESS INT’L (Dec. 19, 2013, 
11:39 AM), http://www.upi.com/blog/2013/12/19/Church-defrocks-minister-for-officiating-
sons-gay-wedding/5361387467941, archived at http://perma.cc/B5YZ-7LVM; Niraj 
Warikoo, Detroit-Area Catholic Leaders Urge Gay Marriage Supporters to Skip 
Communion, DETROIT FREE PRESS (Apr. 9, 2013, 12:27 AM), http://www.freep.com/article/ 
20130408/NEWS05/304080041/Detroit-area-Catholic-leaders, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
Q5HB-6QJT. For an example outside the United States, see Hunter Stuart, Pope Francis 
Excommunicates Australian Priest Who Advocated for Gay Marriage and Female Clergy, 
HUFFINGTON POST (Sept. 24, 2013, 4:42 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/09/24/ 
pope-francis-excommunicates-priest-greg-reynolds_n_3983059.html, archived at http:// 
perma.cc/LSW8-BAEU. Another recent example is the prior Pope’s criticism of American 
nuns for their vocal positions on certain social issues. See, e.g., Beth Hawkins, Sister Brigid 
McDonald Calls Vatican’s Reprimand of U.S. Nun Group a “Misuse of Power,” MINNPOST 
(May 4, 2012), http://www.minnpost.com/minnpost-asks/2012/05/sister-brigid-mcdonald-
calls-vaticans-reprimand-us-nuns-group-misuse-power, archived at http://perma.cc/4KFT-A 
E38. 
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Dworkin would call the “value” dimension with the “science” dimension: 
“[T]he transcendent dimension develops when a person embraces the ultimate 
sense of his or her own life, aware of his or her creaturely condition and 
searching for the divine plan of the creator (‘He’).”217 
On this idea of the social and transcendent dimensions of religion, consider 
this statement by Robert George about what religion and the good of religion 
is: 
In its fullest and most robust sense, religion is the human person’s being 
in right relation to the divine – the more than merely human source or 
sources, if there be such, of meaning and value. Of course, even the 
greatest among us fall short of perfection in various ways. But in the ideal 
of perfect religion, the person would understand as comprehensively and 
deeply as possible the body of truths about spiritual things and would 
fully order his or her life, and share in the life of a community of faith 
that is ordered, in line with those truths. In the perfect realization of 
religion, one would achieve the relationship that the divine – say God 
himself, assuming for a moment the truth of monotheism – wishes us to 
have with Him.218 
To some extent, George and Dworkin might find common ground on the 
idea of a religious attitude entailing an “innate and inescapable responsibility 
to try to make [one’s] life a successful one” and a certain attitude about the 
universe as something of “intrinsic value and wonder.”219 When George, 
however, writes about the “distinct basic human good” of religion as a “good 
that is uniquely architectonic in shaping one’s pursuit of and participation in all 
the basic human goods,”220 I wonder if ethical independence adequately 
captures what George intends. Is it too independent of a conception of religion 
that speaks of respect for human well-being in terms of respect for a person’s 
“flourishing as a seeker of religious truth . . . who lives in line with his or her 
best judgments of what is true in spiritual matters.”221 Put differently, George 
speaks about religious liberty in a religious “quest to understand religious truth 
and order one’s life in line with it.”222 When Dworkin analogizes to artistic 
performance in explaining living well, it seems different from George’s 
account of religion as representing “our efforts to bring ourselves into a 
relationship of friendship with transcendent sources of meaning and value.”223 
 
217 Id. I should make clear that this is not my own view (particularly using the “He” 
pronoun to refer to the divine). I use this critique of Dworkin as illustrative of possible 
objections to his argument. 
218 GEORGE, supra note 18, at 118. 
219 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 10. 
220 GEORGE, supra note 18, at 119. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Id. at 113. 
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(Remember Dworkin’s insistence – discussed in Part II – that there is no 
“blueprint” for such a performance.) 
Certainly, George would reject Dworkin’s distinction between the parts of 
religion that are “parasitic” on a personal god (“godly commitments” such as 
worship) and those that are more centrally concerned with “value.”224 Thus, 
George asserts: 
Our religious questioning, understanding, judging, and practicing shape 
what we do not only in the specifically “religious” aspects of our lives 
(prayer, liturgy, fellowship, and so forth) but in every aspect of our lives. 
It helps us to view our lives as a whole and to direct our choices and 
activities in ways that have integrity – both in the moral sense of that term 
and in the broader sense of having a life that hangs together.225 
One might compare George’s holistic picture of religion in human life to 
Dworkin’s own argument for “value holism.” Religion, George argues, is a 
“basic human good” that also fosters “integrity” in the sense that it “integrates 
all the other intrinsic and constitutive aspects of human well-being and 
fulfillment.”226 It is striking how George’s natural law approach and Dworkin’s 
ethical liberalism framework use so many similar terms, like integrity and 
intrinsic value, but reach such different conclusions about what religion is. 
Certainly, as I discuss below, they reach opposite conclusions about how these 
ideas apply to civil law and marriage. 
George also stresses another function of religion that is not mentioned in 
Dworkin’s book but that is central to discussions of the importance of religious 
liberty: religion, as an institution of civil society – an intermediate association 
between the individual and the state – plays a critical role in inculcating in 
persons the virtues crucial to America’s “experiment in ordered liberty.”227 As 
I elaborate elsewhere, this is the civil society proposition: religious institutions, 
families, and other forms of association are “seedbeds of virtue” that undergird 
and support the political order.228 George also appeals to the role of such 
institutions as providing “buffers” between “the individual and the power of 
the central state,” and warns of the threat to religious liberty when the state 
tries to usurp religion’s functions.229 Jim Fleming and I have engaged this civil 
society proposition and offered an account of civil society’s virtue generating 
 
224 See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 24. 
225 GEORGE, supra note 18, at 113. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 20-22 (“[W]e see the central political role and significance of the most basic 
institutions of civil society – the family, the religious community, private organizations 
(such as the Boy Scouts) devoted to the inculcation of knowledge and virtue, private (often 
religiously based) educational institutions, and the like.”). 
228 See, e.g., MCCLAIN, supra note 52, at 50-54; FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 52, at 
81-111. 
229 GEORGE, supra note 18, at 22 (“These mediating institutions provide a buffer between 
the individual and the power of the central state.”). 
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and buffering functions in our elaboration of constitutional liberalism.230 
Where we differ with George is not my point here; rather, what is striking 
about Dworkin’s account of religion is that he does not address this 
institutional/civil society dimension of religion or indicate how a society 
produces persons capable of taking up the responsibilities of ethical liberalism 
so that they can make a success of their lives.231 
How might Dworkin respond to such criticisms? First, he qualifies his 
argument by explaining that he is not arguing “against the science of the 
traditional Abrahamic religions” or “that there is no personal god who made 
the heavens and loves its creatures.”232 Rather, he reaches back to Hume and 
Plato to insist that a personal god “cannot of his own will create right answers 
to moral questions or instill the universe with a glory it would not otherwise 
have.”233 Dworkin puts the point provocatively. “[W]hether what displeases a 
god is morally wrong is not up to that god”; rather, a god’s “existence or 
character” can only figure as “a minor premise” in the defense of some 
“different, independent background value judgment.”234 Dworkin returns to the 
fact/value distinction employed in his discussion of religion in Justice for 
Hedgehogs.235 Referring to “the existence of a personal god” as a “very exotic 
kind of scientific fact,” Dworkin appeals to “Hume’s principle,” that one 
“cannot support a value judgment – an ethical or moral or aesthetic claim – just 
by establishing some scientific fact about how the world is or was or will be. 
Something else is always necessary: a background value judgment that shows 
why the scientific fact is relevant and has that consequence.”236 
Domingo counters that Dworkin’s argumentation on this point is “weak” 
and reflects a “misconceived moral epistemology,” again resisting Dworkin’s 
distinction between the science and value parts of religion, and the fact/value 
distinction.237 Domingo states, “God is the supreme fact (Supreme Being in the 
Western tradition) and the supreme value (Supreme Good in the Western 
tradition), because, as creator, he gives the real meaning, the ultimate value, to 
human life and the universe.”238 
 
230 See, e.g., FLEMING & MCCLAIN, supra note 52, at 81-111. 
231 James E. Fleming & Linda C. McClain, Dworkin’s Perfectionism, in LAW AND 
DIGNITY: ESSAYS IN HONOUR AND MEMORY OF PROFESSOR RONALD DWORKIN (Lokendra 
Malik ed., forthcoming n.d.). 
232 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 25. 
233 Id. at 25-26. 
234 Id. at 26. 
235 See DWORKIN, supra note 10, 137-38. 
236 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 26-27. 
237 See Domingo, supra note 196, at 375-76 (“In order to ensure the independence of 
morality from science and metaphysics, Dworkin must banish any idea of God from the 
field of value. However, this is a mistake . . . .”). 
238 Id. at 377; see also Smith, supra note 180, at 23-25 (discussing the “great divide” 
between those who “think that the universe, including the world of humanity, is the product 
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Moreover, like George, Domingo stresses that, in the natural law tradition, 
while revelation is one source of moral truth, reason is another, and the latter is 
open to all human beings.239 In this sense, there is some point of common 
ground with Dworkin. George argues that “natural law” – principles 
discernable through the exercise of practical reason – can “provide some 
measure of common moral and even political ground for people who do not 
agree on the existence or the nature of God and the role of God in human 
affairs.”240 At the same time, George says that he believes the answer is “yes” 
to the question: “Is there a divine source of the moral order whose tenets we 
discern in inquiry regarding natural law and natural rights?”241 George insists: 
[W]e should be open to the possibility that God has revealed himself in 
ways that reinforce and supplement what can be known by unaided 
reason. But we do not need agreement on the answer so long as we agree 
about the truths that give rise to the question – namely, that human 
beings, possessing the God-like (literally awesome) powers of reason and 
freedom, are bearers of a profound dignity that is protected by certain 
basic rights.242 
Is Dworkin’s account of the religious attitude open in this way? Domingo and 
other critics conclude that it is not.243 
In the chapter on “Death and Immortality,” Religion Without God returns to 
the argument for the independence of the “value” component of religion from a 
personal god.244 Here, Dworkin evaluates ideas of immortal life and the 
premise that believers need “the carrot of heaven and the stick of hell” and 
eternal punishment to motivate them to follow “canons of living well” laid 
down by “the Sistine God” in “sacred texts” or revealed in prayer.245 Dworkin 
first suggests that if “living well” is “an end in itself,” then that personal god’s 
“main function is not to reward or punish but to instruct, guide, and judge.”246 
Even so, on that account, Dworkin argues, “those believers confront the 
apparent dilemma Plato described in the Euthyphro.”247 In the Euthyphro, 
 
of a loving and intelligent author or designer who created it according to a plan and for a 
good purpose, on the one hand, and on the other those who reject the belief in any guiding 
intelligence and any encompassing or mindful plan”). 
239 See Domingo, supra note 196, at 377 (“Reason is the meeting point between believers 
and non-believers. For believers, human reason is a gleam of the divine reason; for believers 
and non-believers, it is the most powerful human capacity to find the good.”). 
240 GEORGE, supra note 18, at 83. 
241 Id. 
242 Id. at 83-84. 
243 Domingo, supra note 196, at 381 (“[M]oral epistemology should be open to the 
possibility of a transcendent reality, without any limitation besides reasonableness.”). 
244 See DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 149-59. 
245 Id. at 152, 154. 
246 Id. at 154. 
247 Id. 
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Socrates repeatedly asked Euthyphro, “What is ‘piety’?,” and “[W]hether the 
just is always the pious,” challenging Euthyphro’s initial answer that “[p]iety, 
then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to 
them.”248 Euthyphro later seems to agree with Socrates that “the holy has been 
acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy 
because it is loved;” but then reverts to defining piety or holiness as “learning, 
how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers and sacrifices,” leaving 
Socrates “in despair” and still asking Euthyphro to “instruct [him] in the nature 
of piety and impiety.”249 Dworkin explains the application of the Euthyphro 
dilemma to similar questions about the “Sistine god”: 
Does the Sistine God create the right standard of living well just through 
this fiat? If so, then we cannot think we have really made our lives good 
just by obeying that fiat. We have only lived as our god wishes. That may 
be important to our safety, now and forever, but it is not to the moral or 
ethical point. Or is there an independent, objective standard of living 
well? In this case, the Sistine God has only his own opinion about what 
the standard holds. We might think we have good reason to think that that 
god’s opinion is very likely to be better than our own. But what is 
indispensable is not that judgment about moral and ethical expertise but 
the necessarily prior judgment that there is an objective ethical and moral 
truth that someone might sensibly be thought to be an expert about. And 
that prior judgment does not depend on any theist assumption.250 
For Dworkin, it boils down to this “crucial point: “What matters most 
fundamentally to the drive to live well is the conviction that there is, 
independently and objectively, a right way to live.”251 This conviction is at the 
“center of” a “religious attitude to life” and “[i]n this most fundamental respect 
religious theists and religious atheists are as one.”252 Where they may not be as 
one, however, is in how and where they find that “right way to live.” 
B. Practical Problems: Marriage 
In his chapter on “Religious Freedom,” Dworkin proposes a “radical 
reinterpretation” of religious freedom that would shift from conceiving a 
“special right” for theists to a more general right to ethical independence.253 At 
the conclusion of this chapter he comes back to what he calls “undoubtedly the 
most divisive issue of all: sexual and reproductive morality,” referring to 
ongoing constitutional controversies over abortion rights and over whether 
 
248 PLATO, Euthyphro, in THE WORKS OF PLATO 35, 39-50 (Irwin Edman ed., 1982). 
249 Id. at 47, 53-55. 
250 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 154-55. 
251 Id. at 155. 
252 Id. at 155-56. 
253 Id. at 133. 
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same-sex couples have a right to marry.254 Dworkin argues on both issues that 
“if, quite apart from the state of American constitutional law, we treat religious 
freedom as part of ethical independence, then the liberal position becomes 
mandatory.”255 In this Section, I consider the potential of Dworkin’s reframing 
to make progress on the marriage issue. 
At this point, Dworkin incorporates by reference, rather than repeating, his 
prior arguments on these issues, for example, from Life’s Dominion (on 
abortion) and Is Democracy Possible Here? (on “gender equality in 
marriage”).256 As explained in Part I, Dworkin states that the Supreme Court 
had little choice but to ground its opinions limiting government power to 
criminalize “early abortion” or “homosexual acts” in the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution rather than the First 
Amendment’s guarantees of religious freedom, given that, while “opponents of 
homosexuality and abortion very often cite a god’s will as warrant,” “few men 
or women who want choice in these matters conceive their desire as grounded 
in religion.”257 His shift to ethical independence, with its broader view of 
religion, presumably would permit a new understanding, since men and 
women would view choice in these matters as a matter of exercising such 
independence. Will this approach persuade opponents of same-sex marriage or 
soften their opposition? 
Let’s consider how people, exercising their ethical independence, make 
decisions about marriage individually and how a polity that accepts a right to 
ethical independence should regulate the institution of marriage. As previewed 
in Part II, we must consider the respective space for ethical independence and 
for political morality, that is, community settlement on the law of marriage. 
Dworkin states that the “faith” that unites believers and nonbelievers is that 
they believe “each person has an intrinsic and inescapable ethical 
responsibility to make a success of life.”258 Each person, moreover, has a 
“responsibility . . . to decide for himself ethical questions about which kinds of 
lives are appropriate and which would be degrading for him.”259 Thus, “a state 
violates that right whenever it prohibits or burdens homosexual practice, for 
instance.”260 
Making individual ethical decisions is more complex when those decisions 
concern a social institution, such as marriage, which affords a legal framework 
for an intimate adult relationship. How does a political community assess 
whether or not to revise the definition of marriage to allow two men or two 
women to marry? Is Dworkin’s insistence upon the exercise of ethical 
 
254 Id. at 144. 
255 Id. at 144-45. 
256 Id. at 144. 
257 Id. 
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independence compatible with his insistence upon the objectivity of value? Is 
there a “right” answer about what marriage is and who should be allowed to 
marry? If so, how is it discernible? Or is the liberal answer broad tolerance of 
diverse views about what marriage is and what it means? What happens when 
people disagree? 
In the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, United States v. Windsor,261 the 
majority held that section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) (defining 
marriage, for purposes of federal law, as the union of one man and one 
woman) was unconstitutional. The majority opinion expressed what Dworkin 
might call the partnership conception of democracy that protects ethical 
independence in this way: the federal court has long deferred to states in the 
realm of domestic relations, but “[s]tate laws defining and regulating marriage, 
of course, must respect the constitutional rights of persons.”262 The Court cited 
as an example of such a limit on state power its prior opinion in Loving v. 
Virginia, in which it struck down a state antimiscegenation law, which 
restricted a person’s right to marry by barring them from marrying someone of 
a different race.263 This passage from the majority’s opinion – and its citation 
to Loving – has featured prominently in the flurry of post-Windsor federal 
court decisions striking down state marriage laws banning same-sex couples 
from marrying or from having their marriages recognized under state laws.264 
In language that Dworkin would likely have approved, the majority in Windsor 
concluded that section 3 of DOMA was invalid “for no legitimate purpose 
overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the 
State, by its marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity,”265 
stressing the tangible and expressive value of marriage. 
The dissenting opinions faulted the majority in Windsor for taking sides in a 
profound cultural debate about two different views of marriage: a conjugal 
vision and a consent-based vision which emphasized “mutual commitment.”266 
Religious institutions and other groups (including George and his coauthors 
Ryan Anderson and Sherif Girgis) that advanced what Justice Alito called the 
“conjugal model” warned about the harmful consequences to society if 
government departed from a time-honored understanding of what marriage is: 
 
261 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
262 Id. at 2691. 
263 Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
264 See, e.g., De Leon v. Perry, No. SA–13–CA–00982–OLG, 2014 WL 715741, at *34 
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014) (“This fundamental right to marry also entails the ability to 
marry the partner of one’s choosing.” (citing Loving, 388 U.S. at 12)); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 
F. Supp. 2d 456, 476 (E.D. Va. 2014) (“In signaling that due process and equal protection 
guarantees must trump objections to federal intervention, ‘Windsor’s ‘citation to Loving is a 
disclaimer of enormous proportion.’” (quoting Bishop v. United States, 962 F. Supp. 2d 
1252, 1279 (D. Okla. 2014))). 
265 Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2696. 
266 Id. at 2718-19 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
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“[A]n intrinsically opposite-sex institution,” one “inextricably linked to 
procreation and biological kinship.”267 Some rooted this conception of 
marriage in religious tradition; some appealed to a teleology of the body and of 
“one flesh” union.268 All, I am confident, would say that they were defending 
the “true” conception of marriage against a model that distorted marriage’s 
meaning. Thus, in their coauthored and separate writings, George, Anderson, 
and Girgis argue that it is error for the secular government to depart from a 
correct understanding of what marriage is, thus building marriage law upon a 
distorted idea, “falsehood,” or a “lie.”269 Moreover, they also warn that 
redefining marriage threatens religious liberty and traditional moral belief, as 
the belief that marriage is “a union of a man and woman ordered to procreation 
and family life” is viewed as “malicious prejudice to be driven to the margins 
of culture.”270 
Even though George and his coauthors stress the consequences of redefining 
marriage for “observant Christians, Jews, Muslims, and others,”271 George 
contends that the view of marriage he and his coauthors advance reflects 
“insights into the nature of marriage as a human good” and “require no 
particular theology”; government should eschew being “neutral” about 
marriage and instead, marriage law should reflect the “sound understanding of 
marriage” as “conjugal marriage.”272 In his writing with Anderson and Girgis, 
George similarly argues that they can support the one-man/one-woman 
definition of marriage even without appealing to Christian or Jewish teaching, 
but instead by appealing to an account of the purposes of marriage, rooted in 
 
267 Id. at 2718. 
268 Id. (“[M]arriage is essentially the solemnizing of a comprehensive, exclusive, 
permanent union that is intrinsically ordered to producing new life, even it if does not 
always do so.” (citing GIRGIS ET AL., supra note 186, at 23-28)). 
269 George, supra note 187 (“The revisionist view would harm people (especially future 
generations) by distorting their idea of what marriage is.”); Ryan T. Anderson, Marriage: 
What It Is, Why It Matters, and the Consequences of Redefining It, HERITAGE FOUND. (Mar. 
11, 2013), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2013/03/marriage-what-it-is-why-it-mat 
ters-and-the-consequences-of-redefining-it, archived at http://perma.cc/8JZP-B82E 
(“Marriage laws work by embodying and promoting a true vision of marriage, which makes 
sense of those norms as a coherent whole. . . . If the law taught a falsehood about marriage, 
it would make it harder for people to live out the norms of marriage because marital norms 
make no sense, as matters of principle, if marriage is just intense emotional feeling.”); see 
Sherif Girgis, Why Fight for Marriage?, PUB. DISCOURSE (Feb. 6, 2014), http://www.thepub 
licdiscourse.com/2014/02/11982, archived at http://perma.cc/H7AJ-37NP. 
270 Anderson, supra note 269; see also George, supra note 187 (“If marriage is redefined, 
believing what virtually every human society once believed about marriage – that it is a 
male-female union – will be seen increasingly as a malicious prejudice, to be driven to the 
margins of culture. The consequences for observant Christians, Jews, Muslims, and others 
are becoming apparent.”). 
271 See George, supra note 187. 
272 GEORGE, supra note 18, at 126-41. 
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the sexual complementarity of male and female and the procreative 
consequences of sexual union.273 They assert an objective truth of the matter 
and counter the rhetoric of “marriage equality” by stating that, while “we all 
want the law to treat all marriages equally,” line drawing must reflect the 
“truth” of what marriage is; same-sex unions, on their view, simply cannot 
realize the goods of marriage.274 
Some opponents of same-sex marriage appeal more directly to divine 
teaching and to the created order. Recall that, in calling for a separation of the 
“science” part of religion from the “value” part, Dworkin states: 
There is no direct bridge from any story about the creation of the 
firmament, or the heavens and earth, or the animals of the sea and the 
land, or the delights of heaven, or the fires of hell, or the parting of any 
sea or the raising of any dead, to the enduring value of friendship and 
family . . . .275 
This claim certainly runs counter to contemporary arguments about marriage 
and the family that appeal to a teleology of the created order, including the 
human body and sexual complementarity. On such views, the biblical accounts 
of creation, either that God created male and female in his own image, or more 
specifically, that he formed Eve out of Adam’s rib and thus performed (as it 
were) the first marriage, support a view of marriage as the union of one man 
and one woman. This Genesis account is also a critical (even if not always 
explicit) foundation for Girgis, Anderson, and George’s conjugal view of 
marriage as “one flesh” union between one man and one woman. Girgis, for 
example, argues that “revelation” provides “the outline” for what marriage is, 
citing to the Genesis creation stories, but that “natural moral reasoning” helps 
to make sense of revelation with respect to the meaning of the “one-flesh” 
union and the goods of marriage.276 
For a not inconsiderable number of religious people, I argue, there are 
inferences drawn from the created world to the institution of marriage, such as 
the existence of two sexes – male and female – and even the divine command 
to “be fruitful and multiply.” The mystery of one man and one woman joining 
in a “one flesh” union undergirds a deep conviction about gender 
 
273 See generally GIRGIS ET AL., supra note 186. 
274 Ryan T. Anderson, Marriage Matters, and Redefining It Has Social Costs, PUB. 
DISCOURSE (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/01/11880, archived at 
http://perma.cc/RN9L-GNBC. 
275 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 25. 
276 Sherif Girgis, Reason and Revelation: Why Christians Need Philosophy, PUB. 
DISCOURSE (Feb. 4, 2014), http://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2014/02/11978, archived at 
http://perma.cc/V3CX-2YR7. Girgis also observes that marriage features as a “mirror” for 
God’s covenant with Israel and “our union with Christ” when the Eucharist “unites us 
bodily.” Id. These more metaphorical uses of marriage are puzzling, given the author’s 
emphasis on the “one flesh” union of one man and one woman open to procreation. 
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complementarity and the idea (as George puts it) that mothers and fathers 
“tend to bring different gifts to parenting.”277 
How would replacing the idea of religious freedom with a more general 
right to ethical independence address such arguments about conjugal marriage 
and worries about religious liberty? No doubt Dworkin would have a ready 
answer to opponents of same-sex marriage who simply refer to divine authority 
and do not attempt, as do George and his colleagues, to provide a natural law 
foundation. For example, as New York State Senator Ruben Diaz, put it, in 
opposing New York’s marriage equality law (invoking New York’s 
archbishop): “God, not Albany [the capital of New York], has settled the 
definition of marriage a long time ago.”278 Senator Diaz also referred to the 
“great truth” that “marriage is and should remain the union of husband and 
wife” and further argued that “same-sex marriage is a government takeover of 
an institution that government did not create and should not define.”279 And 
just recently, a former Texas state legislator now running for lieutenant 
governor quipped: “I will change my definition of marriage when God changes 
his.”280 
Dworkin would reply, I assume, that merely appealing to what a “personal 
god” says – or does – is insufficient; there must be some independent source of 
value. Then the debate between the Dworkinian proponent of the liberal 
position on marriage and the proponent of conjugal marriage would be at the 
level of what the best interpretive concept of marriage was – as well as of 
marriage equality – or how the political community’s definition must accord 
room to ethical independence. 
One way that political liberals (and here I include myself) address this type 
of argument is to emphasize that there is a distinction between civil and 
religious marriage. Therefore, when same-sex couples seek to marry civilly, 
they are not challenging religious definitions of marriage that are part of 
someone’s comprehensive moral view; religious institutions remain free to 
marry or not marry couples according to their beliefs. Recall Goodridge 
stressing that civil marriage, in Massachusetts, is a secular institution.281 Is this 
sharp line drawing between civil and religious marriage available to a 
Dworkinian approach to the marriage controversy? How might Dworkin 
 
277 George, supra note 187. 
278 N.Y. State S., Reg. Sess., Open Legis. (June 24, 2011) (transcript archived at http:// 
perma.cc/656E-3PUV) (statement of Sen. Ruben Diaz). 
279 Ruben Diaz & Michael Long, If the NY Senate Passes Gay Marriage, It’s 
Republicans Who Will Take the Heat, NAT’L REV. (June 22, 2011, 10:05 AM), http://www. 
nationalreview.com/corner/270218/if-ny-senate-passes-gay-marriage-its-republicans-who-
will-take-heat-ruben-diaz, archived at http://perma.cc/97DT-NA7J. 
280 Manny Fernandez, Federal Judge Strikes Down Texas’ Ban on Same-Sex Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2014, at A13. 
281 See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 (Mass. 2003) (“In 
Massachusetts, civil marriage is, and since pre-Colonial days has been, precisely what its 
name implies: a wholly secular institution.”). 
  
2014] RELIGIOUS LIBERTY WITHOUT CONFLICT 1315 
 
respond to arguments, like those of George, Anderson, and Girgis, that eschew 
(for the most part) any overt reference to God but contain a teleology of 
marriage rooted in ideas of the body and of marriage’s purposes? As an 
interpretive matter, I do not believe that their argument about the truth about 
marriage is reasonable or a sound basis for law and policy. It does not map 
well with contemporary family law about civil marriage or constitutional law 
concerning intimate association, marriage and family. After all, in the 
landmark case Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court declared marriage a “noble” 
association, “intimate to the degree of being sacred,” in a case striking down a 
state ban on the use of contraception by married couples.282 (In fact, they are 
quite critical of certain features of contemporary family law, such as no-fault 
divorce laws, viewing such changes as weakening marriage by a “revisionist 
view that is more about adults’ desires than children’s needs.”283) It is a 
comprehensive moral view (to use Rawls’s concept here) that is not publicly 
accessible by people who do not share their distinctive teleological analysis of 
conjugal union and should not be the basis for civil marriage law.284 They do 
not have a persuasive answer to why, on their view of the goods of marriage, 
state laws that permit marriage by opposite sex couples who are infertile, 
elderly, or do not intend to procreate, or who will be able to procreate only 
through means of reproduction that do not involve their “one flesh” bodily 
union, should not also allow same-sex couples to marry, particularly when 
some of those couples may intend to become parents through adoption or 
assisted reproduction.285 Moreover, the insistence that gender complementarity 
is essential to marriage and to parenting runs contrary to contemporary family 
law, which reflects the transformation from the common law model of 
marriage with its fixed, hierarchical roles of husband and wife and even from 
the complementary roles of separate spheres ideology to the present day 
conception of marriage as an equal partnership. So, too, the law of parentage 
 
282 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
283 Anderson, supra note 269. 
284 In a book in progress, A Future for Marriage?, Stephen Macedo offers a thorough and 
persuasive critique of their argument, from a political liberal perspective. Stephen Macedo, 
A Future for Marriage (Apr. 29, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
Macedo analyzes the George, Anderson, and Girgis conception of marriage as an example 
of the “New Natural Law” and concludes, with respect to that conception: 
The law of a religiously diverse political community ought not to be based – indeed, it 
may not legitimately be based – on philosophically or religiously sectarian systems of 
thought such as that supplied by the New Natural Law. The New Natural Law’s 
conception of marriage and sex is perfectly respectable if conceived as the perfectionist 
ethic of those who embrace its system of ideas and commitments. If asserted as a guide 
to the law that will be imposed on all, then it fails to respect the range of reasonable 
views concerning marriage and sexuality in our society. 
Id. 
285 See, e.g., GEORGE, supra note 18, at 133-34 (replying to Stephen Macedo’s criticisms 
along these lines). 
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and the law of custody largely reject preferences in favor of mother or based 
on premises about gender differences in parenting.286 Courts have repeatedly 
rejected appeals to procreation and to optimal child rearing as rationales for 
excluding same-sex couples from marriage, pointing out that procreation is not 
a prerequisite to marriage and that same-sex and opposite-sex couples are 
similarly situated in their capacity to be loving, responsible parents.287 Here, 
courts are also considering and rejecting moral arguments: that, somehow, 
having gay or lesbian parents is harmful to child outcomes. Instead, inspired by 
Justice Kennedy’s reference in Windsor to the humiliation that children of 
lawfully married same-sex couples face when the federal government does not 
recognize their marriage, courts striking down state marriage laws stress the 
harm to children from not allowing their parents to marry or have their 
marriages recognized.288 
Effective rebuttals of arguments against revising civil marriage laws to 
permit same-sex marriage may well be available under Dworkin’s framework, 
but I believe the distinction (supported by political liberalism as well as by the 
religion clauses of the Constitution) between civil and religious marriage 
makes it easier to make such rebuttals, because one need not prove who has the 
better view of what marriage “really” is, depending upon one’s ethical 
convictions about the universe and about value. That said, a recent federal 
district court opinion striking down Virginia’s statutory and constitutional ban 
on marriage by two persons of the same-sex does provide a fruitful example of 
a Dworkinian idea of battles over an interpretive concept.289 Judge Arenda 
Wright Allen observed that all the parties before her “appreciate the sacred 
 
286 For critical evaluation of appeals to gender complementarity in light of these changes 
in family law, see Susan Frelich Appleton, Gender and Parentage: Family Law’s Equality 
Project in Our Empirical Age, in WHAT IS PARENTHOOD? CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT 
THE FAMILY 237, 237-45 (Linda C. McClain & Daniel Cere eds., 2013); Linda C. McClain, 
“God’s Created Order,” Gender Complementarity, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 
20 BYU J. PUB. L. 313, 327-43 (2006). 
287 An early example is Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 954 
(Mass. 2003). A recent example is DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 
2014), in which there was a bench trial on the challenge brought by same-sex couples to 
Michigan’s constitutional amendment barring marriage by same-sex couples or recognition 
of such marriages. The State of Michigan argued that one justification for Michigan’s 
marriage amendment was “the premise that heterosexual married couples provide the 
optimal environment for raising children.” Id. at 770. The court rejected that rationale, 
finding that “state defendants cited a small number of outlier studies in support of the 
optimal child-rearing rationale,” but that “the overwhelming weight of the scientific 
evidence supports the ‘no differences’ viewpoint.” Id. at 770-71. 
288 See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2694 (2013) (“The law in 
question makes it even more difficult for the children to understand the integrity and 
closeness of their own family and it concord with other families in their community and in 
their daily lives.”). 
289 See Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
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principles embodied in our fundamental right to marry”; that is, each 
“cherishes the commitment demonstrated in the celebration of marriage” and 
“embraces the Supreme Court’s characterization of marriage as ‘the most 
important relation in life’ and ‘the foundation of the family and society, 
without which there could be neither civilization nor progress.’”290 
“Regrettably,” she continued, “the Proponents and the Opponents of Virginia’s 
Marriage Laws part ways despite this shared reverence for marriage . . . over a 
dispute regarding who among Virginia’s citizenry may exercise the 
fundamental right to marry.”291 The court resolved that dispute by appealing to 
constitutional principles, that is, principles of due process liberty and equal 
protection and Windsor’s teaching that the state’s authority to regulate 
marriage is subject to the federal constitution, by analogy to Loving. Judge 
Allen rejected the idea that plaintiffs sought to exercise a “new” right, 
countering that they simply sought to enjoy the “same” right enjoyed by 
“heterosexual individuals: the right to make a public commitment to form an 
exclusive relationship and create a family with a partner with whom the person 
shares an intimate and sustaining emotional bond.”292 Such a right, she 
continued, quoting another federal district ruling striking down Utah’s 
marriage ban, “is deeply rooted in the nation’s history and implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty because it protects an individual’s ability to make 
deeply personal choices about love and family free from government 
interference.”293 To frame this in Dworkin’s approach, this interpretation of the 
right to marry protects an individual’s right to ethical independence in the 
foundational matter of intimate life. Recall Dworkin’s insistence, in all of his 
work, that, pursuant to principles of dignity, coercive government is legitimate 
only when it attempts to show equal concern for the fates of all it governs and 
full respect for their personal responsibility for their own lives.294 Dworkin 
might observe that a state’s failure to recognize a valid out of state marriage 
entered into by its citizens or its ban on marriage by same-sex couples failed to 
show equal concern for fate of all it governs or to respect their dignity. Here, 
the liberal use by the federal district courts in Virginia, Utah, Oklahoma, and 
elsewhere of Justice Kennedy’s language in Windsor fortifies this point: in 
addition to not showing respect for their ethical independence by respecting 
their choice of marriage partner, these restrictions “demean” their existence, 
humiliate their children, and so forth.295 
 
290 Id. at 471. 
291 Id. at 472. 
292 Id. 
293 Id. (quoting Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1202-03 (D. Utah 2013)). 
294 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 3, at 145-47 (“It is inconsistent with someone’s 
dignity ever to submit to the coercive authority of others in deciding what role religious or 
comparable ethical values should play in his life, so the partnership conception requires 
some guarantee that the majority will not impose its will in those matters . . . .”). 
295 See, e.g., De Leon v. Perry, No. SA13-CA-00982-OLG, 2014 WL 715741, at *2 
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The brevity of Religion Without God leaves a reader wanting to know how 
Dworkin might address the explosion of evident conflicts, as more states 
change their civil marriage laws, between religious liberty and marriage 
equality. This is the conflict, as discussed previously, of which George and his 
colleagues frequently write. Invoking the rhetoric of the dissenting opinions in 
Windsor, they warn that, “[b]y deeming conjugal marriage supporters bigots, 
the [Supreme] Court makes it easier for lawmakers and courts to use anti-
discrimination laws and public education to drive us to the margins of public 
life.”296 Reframed as a right to ethical independence, rather than a special right, 
what sort of right does a religious person have to, for example, refuse goods 
and services to a same-sex couple because to do so, he or she argues, 
compromises the ability to define ethical values and live by those values?297 If 
a religious person is a public official, may he or she be free to refuse to issue a 
marriage license due to religious conviction? Dworkin offers only a brief hint 
of his approach, when he considers how the requirement of “equal concern” 
might bear on the question of exemptions from the obligation to obey general, 
nondiscriminatory laws.298 Government, he says, must “notice whether any 
group regards the activity it proposes to prohibit or burden as a sacred duty,” 
and if so, “must consider whether equal concern for that group requires an 
exemption or other amelioration,” if giving one can be done “with no 
significant damage to the policy in play.”299 Contrary to what actually 
happened in Massachusetts, thus, Dworkin writes that “financing Catholic 
adoption agencies that do not accept same-sex couples as candidates, on the 
same terms as financing agencies that do, might be justified in that way, 
provided that enough of the latter are available so that neither babies nor same-
sex couples seeking a baby are injured.”300 But he also argues for the “priority 
 
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 26, 2014) (“Texas’s current marriage laws deny homosexual couples the 
right to marry, and in doing so, demean their dignity for no legitimate reason.”). 
296 Girgis, supra note 269; see, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2717-18 
(Alito, J., dissenting) (contending that to apply heightened scrutiny to DOMA would “cast 
all those who cling to traditional beliefs about the nature of marriage in the role of bigots or 
superstitious fools”); id. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[W]ithout some more 
convincing evidence that [DOMA’s] principal motive was to codify malice, and that it 
furthered no legitimate governmental interests, I would not tar the political branches with 
the brush of bigotry.”). 
297 A prominent case invoked in these discussions is Elane Photography v. Willock, 284 
P.3d 428, 445 (N.M. Ct. App. 2013) (upholding the lower court’s ruling that applying New 
Mexico’s public accommodation law to a photographer who refused, because of Christian 
beliefs, to photograph a same-sex commitment ceremony did not violate the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment). The Supreme Court declined to hear the case. Id. 
298 DWORKIN, supra note 1, at 136 (“The last of these requirements – equal concern – 
requires a legislature to notice whether any group regards the activity it proposes to prohibit 
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of nondiscriminatory collective government over private religious exercise” as 
“inevitable and right,” for example, refusing an exemption when giving one 
“would put people at a serious risk that it is the purpose of the law to avoid.”301 
I regret that we cannot look forward to Dworkin’s further contribution on the 
religious exemption and religious accommodations issues, which are likely to 
be of increasing concern as new political majorities expand protection of 
persons from discrimination based on sexual orientation, including in civil 
marriage laws. 
CONCLUSION 
I conclude this Article on a more personal note. At a symposium held at 
Boston University School of Law several years ago, Dworkin, in offering a 
response to the many commentaries on his manuscript for Justice for 
Hedgehogs, remarked that the event – gathering numerous people to “come 
together to discuss a book of mine” before publication so he could “benefit 
from what they say” – was his vision of heaven. He continued: “The best part 
is that I don’t even have to die.” In the final chapter of Religion Without God, 
Dworkin begins by reporting Woody Allen’s quip, when he “was told that he 
would live on in his work,” that “he would rather live on in his apartment.”302 
It has been a palpable if bittersweet pleasure to read Dworkin’s final book, 
Religion Without God, mindful that he had “planned to greatly extend his 
treatment of the subject over the next few years,” but was prevented from 
doing so by illness.303 The book is based on lectures, which are so vividly and 
characteristically in Dworkin’s voice that it is really like being in a room 
hearing him speak again. As Moshe Halbertal observes, a unique feature of 
Religion Without God is that Dworkin “conveys a philosophical, even spiritual 
sensibility,” with the ambition of bringing about “a transformation in the way 
we see the world and in the stance we take toward the most basic features of 
our existence.”304 As I read Religion Without God, I thought back to the 
Epilogue of Justice for Hedgehogs, in which Dworkin made this observation 
about the importance of meeting the challenge of living well in one’s situation: 
Remember, too, that the stakes are more than mortal. Without dignity our 
lives are only blinks of duration. But if we manage to lead a good life 
well, we create something more. We write a subscript to our morality. We 
make our lives tiny diamonds in the cosmic sands.305 
 
301 Id. at 136-37 (offering the example of a refusal to exempt religious ingestion of 
peyote). 
302 Id. at 149. 
303 Id. at ix. 
304 Halbertal, supra note 34, at 1. 
305 DWORKIN, supra note 10, at 423. 
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This passage from Dworkin reminds me of one of my favorite poems, A Psalm 
of Life, by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow. In it, the poet exhorts us that “Life is 
real! Life is earnest,” and declares: 
 
 
Lives of great men all remind us 
We can make our lives sublime, 
And, departing, leave behind us 
Footprints on the sands of time; 
Footprints, that perhaps another, 
Sailing o’er life’s solemn main, 
A forlorn and shipwrecked brother, 
Seeing, shall take heart again. 
Let us, then, be up and doing, 
With a heart for any fate; 
Still achieving, still pursuing, 
Learn to labor and to wait.306 
 
 
306 HENRY WADSWORTH LONGEFELLOW, A Psalm of Life, in HENRY WADSWORTH 
LONGFELLOW 49, 49-50 (1906). Dworkin, of course, might well view this poem as 
expressing an impact, rather than adverbial model of life going well! 
